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Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land Development
Linkage
Fred P. Bosselman* and Nancy E. Stroud**

At the end of every three years you shall bring forth all the
tithe of your produce in the same year, and lay it up within your
towns; and the

. . .

sojourner, the fatherless and the widow, who

are within your towns, shall come and eat and be filled; that the
Lord your God may bless you in all the work of your hands that
you do.1

I.

Introduction

The voluntary tithe, as a moral obligation designed to encourage
successful people to contribute to charitable causes, has ancient roots in
the Judeo-Christian tradition. In recent years, the idea of a mandatory
tithe for land developers has appeared in the form of local regulations
that condition the approval of certain types of land development on the
developer's agreement to contribute to certain other types of development that further particular public purposes. For example, someone
who wants to build a downtown office building is allowed to do so only
by also contributing to the construction of new housing. These programs are often described as "linkage" programs.
This article will review the legal issues posed by linkage programs.
To do so it will first look at the historical trends out of which linkage
programs evolved. The article describes in more detail the linkage programs in a few communities and compares these programs to related
regulatory schemes such as inclusionary zoning, incentive zoning and
transfer of development rights. The article then examines federal con* B.A., University of Colorado; J.D., Harvard University. Partner - Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, Chicago, Illinois.
** B.A., Indiana University; M.R.P., J.D., University of North Carolina. Partner - Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, Boca Raton, Florida.
This article is prepared as a part of a more extensive study of development exactions, sponsored by the Homer Hoyt Institute at Florida State University.
1. Deuteronomy 14: 28-29 (Rev. Standard ed.).
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stitutional issues raised by linkage programs in light of evolving Supreme Court doctrine. Finally, the article reviews the ways in which
the courts of different states are likely to approach linkage.
In view of the concern expressed by most developers toward
linkage programs, it is ironic that these programs have evolved out of
two trends in land use regulation that have been strongly supported by
the development industry: (1) the replacement of pre-set zoning regulations with flexible impact analysis techniques, and (2) the search for
ways to avoid the exclusionary effect of traditional zoning policies.
II.

The PUD Movement

In the 1950's and 1960's one of the most common complaints of
the development industry was that traditional zoning regulations were
too rigid. The regulations were designed to replicate the development
patterns of the 1920's, the era when zoning was born and when the
previous boom in land development took place. These regulations assumed that most residential development would take the form of single
family houses on individual lots. Office buildings and retail stores
would be located in the central business district radiating out from the
"prime" corner. Apartments, which were sometimes thought of as a
commercial rather than a residential use, were limited to the fringes of
the central business district.2
The development industry quickly saw that the postwar auto-oriented society was seeking a different product. Inflated land costs were
pricing the detached house out of the reach of most potential buyers
and creating a demand for clustered housing. The new outlying shopping centers were only the first evidence of a demand for a wide range
of commercial, office and light industrial development in areas far from
traditional urban cores. 3 Zoning was not designed to encourage the
type of development the market then demanded. Minimum lot size and
yard requirements made housing expensive. 4 Standard commercial bulk
2. See Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111
U. PA. L. REV. 1040, 1060-61 (1963).
3. See TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND: A
CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE To GROWTH 82-88 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Task Force];
G. FUQUITT, P. Voss & J. DOHERTY, GROWTH AND CHANGE IN RURAL AMERICA 9-12
(1979); ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND
RURAL AMERICA: POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH

(1968) [hereinafter cited as ADVI-

SORY COMMISSION].

4.

W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANSCAPE 201-02 (1968).
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and layout rules gave little guidance for developments that were not
tied to existing commercial districts, and rigid use-separation rules
often prevented the type of mixed-use development that made the most
5
sense.
The development industry's response was to promote the planned
unit development, or PUD, concept. 6 Its proponents argued that once
developments achieved a certain size (often five acres) the interrelationship of the various parts of the development became of equal if not
greater importance than the relationship to surrounding uses. Because
the entire development was being planned as a whole it was possible to
control the development through the approval of a master development
plan. The availability of this control opportunity meant that traditional
yard, lot, bulk and even use regulations could be abandoned, or at least
relaxed, in favor of the more flexible evaluation of the proposed master
plan in accordance with more general planning principles.7
As acceptance of the PUD concept grew, developments in rapidly
growing areas increasingly took advantage of this technique. 8 In some
instances the PUD concept swallowed up the zoning ordinance that
gave it birth and regurgitated it in the form of standards for evaluating
the impact of proposed PUDs. These standards carried names such as
impact zoning or performance zoning and were designed to replace
traditional zoning regulations. 9
The key policy of the PUD concept was that each development of
substantial size deserved to be evaluated on its own merits. The popularity of environmental and fiscal impact analysis during the 1970's led
to the evaluation of new development not only on the basis of traditional zoning concerns, such as the impact on immediate neighbors, but
on broader environmental policies and on the fiscal health of the community. Such regulatory techniques that use impact analysis as a major

5.

2 N.

WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW

229-34 (1974).

6. See generally Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge To Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 4 (1965); D.
MANDELKER, CONTROLLING PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS (American Society of Planning Officials Series 1967); FRONTIERS OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT:
A SYNTHESIS OF EXPERT OPINION (R. Burchell ed. 1973).

7.

Vladeck, Large Scale Developments and One House Zoning Controls, 20

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255 (1955).
8. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 265-269
9. See, e.g., KENDIG, CONNER, BYRD & HEYMAN, PERFORMANCE

(1981).
ZONING

(1980); Yannocone, Jr., Rahenkamp & Cerchione, Impact Zoning: Altenative to Exclusion in the Suburbs, 8 URB. LAW. 417 (1976).
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
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component effectively delay the land use controls until the developer's
intentions are known. 10
This new "wait-and-see" type of regulation required a major
change in the theory of land use regulation. As originally conceived,
land use regulation was to be based on a map dividing the jurisdiction
into zoning districts. An ordinance would set forth the criteria under
which development could take place in each district. A developer would
only need to read the map and ordinance to determine the rules applicable to any particular tract of land."' The proponents of this system of
regulation justified it because the preparation of a map based on an
overall plan of the entire community would provide a reciprocity of
benefits to all property owners.1 2 Even though use of a particular tract
was restricted, the owner obtained the benefits of living in a more orderly and efficient community.13
The importance of an overall plan was such a significant element
in defense of zoning regulations that the proponents of zoning vigorously opposed any efforts to encourage significant change in the plan
through administrative variance. 4 Amendments to the map were permitted, but only under rules designed to discourage changes in small
parcels. 15 And regulations devised in response to specific development
proposals were prohibited under the label of "contract zoning." 1
In practice, however, the creation of an "end-state plan" setting
forth the future use of land proved extremely difficult. 17 Rapid changes
in economic and social conditions forced planners to reevaluate plans
regularly or see them become obsolete. It became popular to say that
planning should be a process of controlling change rather than a map.,,

10.

Task Force, supra note 3, at 189.

11.

E.

BASSETT, ZONING: THE LAWS, ADMINISTRATION, AND COURT DECISIONS

DURING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS,

50 (2d ed. 1940).

12. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)("[A]n average reciprocity of advantage ...has been recognized as a justification for various laws"). See
Lefcoe, California's Land Planning Requirements: The Case for Deregulation, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 447, 457-58 (1981).
13. D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 21-22 (1982). See S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 124-26 (1969); R. BABCOCK,THE ZONING GAME 116-20 (1966).
14. See E. BASSETT, supra note 11, at 121.
15.

1 R.

16.

See E.

5.17 (2d ed. 1976).
BASSETT, supra note 11, at 184.
17. See MODEL LAND DEV. CODE art. 3 commentary (Official Draft 1975).
18. 1 N. WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 5, at at 26-27. See Rose, Planningand DealPiecemeal Land Controls As a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §

ing:
837, 874-78 (1983).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss3/1

6

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

1985]

Mandatory Tithes

Moreover, many elected local government officials learned that the
map was a handicap. If all the rules were pre-established by the map
and accompanying regulations, the developer would not need the approval of the local legislative body before undertaking a project. And if
the project proved unpopular with the public the elected official would
take the heat without having been able to stop the project. 9
This handicap could be avoided, however, by preparing a map
classifying most undeveloped land into some relatively restricted category, forcing each developer to seek an amendment from the legislative
body. When the National Commission on Urban Problems studied the
discovered a dramatic shift toward this
subject in the late 1960's, they
20
zoning.
wait-and-see
of
type
Because wait-and-see zoning was hard to square with the overall
plan theory on which zoning was originally based,21 new techniques
such as planned unit development were devised to legitimize the process. 22 But many communities continued to rely on the process of rezoning in response to each major development, knowing that potential
challenges to the legitimacy of the process would be difficult and timeconsuming. 23
Bargaining between developer and local government became the
way the regulatory process worked. It evolved in that way because both
sides get some benefits out of a bargaining process. The developer benefits by being able to buy land that is not predesignated for intensive
development and thus does not command as high a price as it otherwise
would. The elected official benefits by retaining legislative discretion to
discourage development disliked by the voters and to obtain contributions from developers toward the construction of public facilities. The
process of bargaining over the impact of each development proposal has
become so common that some respected commentators have suggested
that zoning be abolished and replaced with a more tightly regulated
bargaining process.24
As bargaining became a way of life, however, the predictability of
land use regulation obviously declined. From the perspective of the lo19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 8, at 59.
ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 206-07.
Id. at 223-24.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
C. PETERSON & C. MCCARTHY, HANDLING ZONING AND LAND USE LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 234-45 (1982).
24. See Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 719 (1980).
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cal government, wait-and-see regulation would work only if the government retained legislative discretion to approve or deny the developer's
request. Such discretion would give the government the flexibility to
ask for an unlimited range of design changes, contributions or other
"sweeteners" from the developer without being bound by any set of
prearranged rules. The local governing body would merely need to suggest that the absence of such sweeteners would mean disapproval of the
development proposal. The developer was left with the unenviable
choice of complying or challenging on the basis of an abuse of legislative discretion. 5
While some communities dealt with developers on a purely ad hoc
basis, others took the initiative to define in advance the types of sweeteners they were looking for by names such as "incentive zoning." Incentive zoning is the term usually used to define those regulations that
permit a developer to exceed the bulk or density standards otherwise
controlling if the development is designed to include some specific feature that promotes a particular government policy.2"
The desired feature that started the incentive zoning trend was the
downtown plaza. Seeing a need for more open spaces in the "canyons"
of Manhattan, New York City's planners allowed the developers of
Lever House to exceed the height limitations in exchange for the installation of a plaza at street level.17 A decade later windswept plazas at
the base of Miesian slabs became the norm.2 8 Dazzled by their success,
New York City's planners began giving similar incentives or bonuses to
developers who put shopping arcades, theaters, and a wide range of
other uses in their buildings.2 9
An outgrowth of incentive zoning is transfer of development rights
(TDR), a term used to describe a wide variety of programs. The more

25.

Task Force, supra note 3, at 189-91. See J.

& J. WADLEY,
(1980).
Mandelker, The Basic Philosophy of Zoning: Incentive or Restraint, in THE
JUERGENSMEYER

ZONING ATTACKS AND DEFENSES: THE LAW IN FLORIDA 31-33

26.

NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES

14 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970).
27. Elliott & Marcus, New DirectionsIn Land Development Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 56 (1973).
28. See A. SPIRN, THE GRANITE GARDEN: URBAN NATURE AND HUMAN DESIGN
77-79, 247 (1984); C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING: THE ONCE AND FUTURE
FRONTIER 61-62 (1979).
29.

Weaver & Babcock, supra note 28, at 300-02. See Weinstein, How New

York's Zoning Has Changed To Induce the Construction of Legitimate Theaters in
THE NEW ZONING, supra note 26, at 131.
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sweeping TDR systems demand that developers seeking to build more
than certain specified quantaities of development in a particular "transfer" area must buy up the equivalent rights to develop property from a
"preservation" area that the government is trying to protect from development. 30 These TDR programs seek to make the development in-

dustry bear the cost of preserving landmarks or agricultural land by
apportioning a relatively small share of those preservation costs to each
developer who seeks to build at the density levels designed for the
31
transfer areas.
In many communities, the bargaining process is much more free-

wheeling than in these more structured systems, and the actual power
wielded by the local government is much greater than the case law

might lead one to believe.32 This has led to a number of proposals for
change in the system to reduce the extent of legislative discretion in

reviewing individual development proposals. 3 The desire for change
was stimulated in a large part by the exclusionary nature of many of
these regulations.

III.

Exclusionary Zoning

The highly discretionary land use controls encouraged by the PUD
movement helped those who sought to keep minorities out of rapidly
growing areas by making it extremely difficult to challenge the exclu30. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 533-51 (1978); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer:

An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights As a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35 (1974);
Bozung, Transfer Development Rights: Compensation For Owners Of Restricted Property, 6 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 129 (1983).
3 1.

For a more critical evaluation of the TDR concept see Note, The Unconstitu-

tionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1001, 1113-21 (1975);
Gale, The Transfer of Development Rights: Some Equity Considerations, 14 URE. L.
ANN. 81, 88, 96 (1977); R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 8, at 701. Professor
Norman Williams suggests that such programs "clearly open up increased opportunities for either (a) carrying out a rational program on the allocation of density, or (b)
graft and corruption on really large scale." WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 376.
32. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 8, at 234-80.
33. See, e.g., Fasano v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. 574, 507
P.2d 23 (1973); COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT CHOICES IN THE '80s, THE AFFORDABLE
COMMUNITY: GROWTH, CHANGE AND CHOICE IN THE '80s 88-90 (1981); HOUSING
FOR ALL UNDER LAW 408-10 (R. Fishman ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING
FOR ALL]; J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 25, at 77-79; MODEL LAND
DEV. CODE §2-201-§2-212 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
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sionary aspect of the regulations. The standing hurdles, the problems of
proof and the high cost of such cases has meant that exclusionary zoning can be proven only in cases where the violations were repeated and
blatant, 4 despite the fact that the Supreme Court interpreted the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 to permit actions against communities that employed a pattern of zoning practices designed to exclude minorities.3 5
As the issue of exclusionary zoning became a subject of general
public discussion, some of the more rapidly growing local governments
concluded that their exclusionary zoning policies were having an adverse effect on their own communities. When they discovered that they
could not hire policemen, firemen and school teachers from within their
own boundaries, some of the larger jurisdictions began to ask developers to reserve a specific, small fraction of new units in each development for federally subsidized housing. Such a policy became known as
"inclusionary zoning."
The policy basis for this approach grew out of the "critical mass"
and "tipping point" theories that had been propounded by observers of
racial and ethnic population movements. A modest number of minority
group members could be integrated into a neighborhood without having
substantial adverse effect, but if the numbers reached a "tipping point"
the original residents would flee. When this theory was applied to housing there was an assumption that so long as the great majority of the
housing stock could be maintained at a price and quality level sufficient
to form a "critical mass" the introduction of a small percentage of subsidized housing for lower income groups would not cause a substantial
decline in neighborhood property value.3 6

34. Warth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Hope, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 738
F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049
(N.D. Ohio 1980), modified, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926
(1982). Compare HOUSING FOR ALL, supra note 33, at 126-31, with Silverman, Housingfor All Under Law: The Limits of Legalist Reform, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 99, 11420 (1979). See also Lamb & Lustig, The Burger Court, Exclusionary Zoning, and the
Activist-Restraint Debate, 4 U. PITT. L. REV. 169 (1978); Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEx. L. REV.
1217 (1977). See generally D. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION
(1977).
35. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
36. See Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policyand Legal Issues in Requiring
Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1432 (1974). A
recent summary of local inclusionary ordinances is found in A. MALLACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 196-264 (1984).
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Inclusionary zoning ordinances were adopted by a number of the
larger local governments where substantial growth was taking place
during the early 1970's. These ordinances required (or in some case,

offered incentives for) the inclusion of a percentage of subsidized low
income housing in each housing development. Among the communities

adopting this type of ordinance were a number of the jurisdictions surrounding Washington, D.C. and a number the large and growing

southern California communities. 37 Inclusionary zoning received a setback in 1973 when the Virginia Supreme Court found the Fairfax
County ordinance to be invalid under the Virginia Constitution.38 Because of the Virginia Supreme Court's long history of antipathy to local government regulation,39 the decision wasn't treated very seriously
in states like California where the state courts were at the opposite end
of the spectrum.40 But in more conservative states, the Virginia decision

was viewed as a roadblock to experimentation with inclusionary
4

zoning. 1
The withdrawal of federal housing subsidies under the Reagan administration eliminated any pretense that inclusionary zoning could be

accomplished in a cost-free manner.42 In the absence of subsidies, inclusionary zoning would subject developers to a major financial burden. 43 Searching for a more satisfactory approach, local governments

have begun the transformation of inclusionary zoning from a regulatory
tool imposed on the residential development industry to an exaction imposed on non-residential development.

37. Kleven, supra note 36, at 1439-46.
38. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Co. v. DeGroff Enter., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d
600 (1973).
39. Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761, 831.
40. Hagman, Taking Care of One's Own through Inclusionary Zoning: Bootstrapping Low- and Moderate-Income Housing by Local Government 5 URB. L. &
PoL. 169 (1982).

41. See, e.g., Note, Board of Supervisors v. DeGroffEnterprises,Inc.: A Case of
Inclusionary Zoning, 60 IOWA L. REV. 413, 418 (1974); H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A.
LEVIN, INZONING: A GUIDE FOR POLICY-MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 33, 139 (1974); R. BURCHELL, MT. LAUREL II: CHALLENGE AND DELIVERY OF
Low COST HOUSING 351 (1984); J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 25, at
148-53 (1980).
42. See Baade, Required Low-Income Housing in Residential Developments:
Constitutional Challenges to a Community Imposed Quota, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 439,
445, 460 (1974).
43. See A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 86-103; Muth, Redistribution of Income
Through Regulation in Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 691, 707-10 (1983).
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
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Linkage Programs

Job-generating facilities, such as office parks or industrial development, can more easily be shown to create a need for low-income housing than residential development does. If an exaction is to be imposed,
should not commercial and industrial development pay rather than residential development? 44 Should communities be allowed to encourage
development that would create jobs but forbid the housing needed by
the workers?
In 1980 the City of San Francisco began implementing a linkage
program to encourage office developers to build housing.45 Specifically,
under the Office Housing Production Program developers of office
buildings containing more than 50,000 square feet are required to build
or finance the amount of new housing in the City that will be needed to
house the office workers generated by the development. The requirement is based on the following assumptions: office use generates one
employee per two hundred and fifty square feet; forty percent of all
office employees in San Francisco reside in San Francisco; and 1.8
working adults occupy each residential unit. This generates a requirement of approximately nine new dwelling units per 10,000 square feet
46
of office space.

The new housing can be for people of any income level, but the
developers are given incentives to produce modestly priced housing by
allowing them to provide fewer units if the units are for moderate income people. There are no restrictions on the location in San Francisco
in which the housing must be built. As alternative to building housing,
the developer may contribute to a municipal housing trust - known as
the Shared Appreciation Mortgage Pool. The amount of contribution is
6,000 dollars for each housing unit required. The trust funds are used
to reduce mortgage payments of low and middle income house buyers.417 As of April 1984, the City of San Francisco states that its pro44. See Ellickson, The Irony of Exclusionary Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167
(1981).
45. A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 180-85; Tegeler, Developer Payments and
Downtown Housing Trust Funds, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 679, 682-83 (1984); Diamond, The San FranciscoOffce-Housing Program:Social Policy Underwrittenby Private Enterprise, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 449 (1983).
46. D. MARINO, STRATEGIES FOR LINKED DEVELOPMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF
APPROACHES IN OTHER CITIES 3 (Chicago Dept. of Planning Report, Dec. 6, 1984);
Diamond, supra note 45, at 428.
47. For example, (a) two housing credits per affordable unit for moderate-in-
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gram has generated almost 3000 units of housing, a majority of which
were for low and moderate income families. In addition, the trust fund
has accrued approximately five million dollars.48 Despite its success,
critics have continued to argue that San Francisco's program ought to
be oriented exclusively toward moderately priced housing, and studies
are currently underway that may lead to revision of the program.4 9
Boston has now adopted a linkage program based on a somewhat
similar analysis. The Boston program applies to developers of office,
retail, hotel and institutional facilities and to developers of any use
which will reduce the amount of existing low and moderate income

housing. The threshold for application of the program is 100,000
square feet of floor area. Each such developer must pay a fee of fortytwo dollars per square foot of floor area at the time the certificate of

occupancy is issued, and must contract to pay a similar fee in each of
the subsequent eleven years.5 0 The fee is to be turned over to a neigh-

borhood housing trust to be used for the development of low and moderate income housing. The fee amounts to five dollars per square foot

spread out over a twelve-year period in equal payments. 1 The first major project to which the fee is being applied is a 326 million dollar
come households built using governmental financial assistance, provided the developer
contributes to the construction costs; (b) three housing credits per affordable unit for
moderate-income households provided without government operating subsidies; and (c)
four housing credits for low-income households provided without government operating
subsidies. A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 181-83; Diamond, supra note 45, at 458-59.
48. D. MARINO, supra note 46, at 4; Sedway, Inclusionary Zoning Conference
Presentation on the San Francisco Office Housing Production Program (Oct. 4, 1983)
(unpublished manuscript available from the authors). The impact of office development
in downtown San Francisco has been a source of other litigation. See San Franciscans
for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 3d 61,
Cal. Rptr. 634 (1984). For a historical perspective see Svirsky, San Francisco: The
Downtown Development Bonus System in THE NEW ZONING, supra note 26 at 139.
49. D. MARINO, supra note 46, at 5. In December 1983, the city of Santa Barbara adopted a housing mitigation policy with emphasis on low and moderate income
housing. See Burch, Bozung, Miller & Hill, Land Use Controversies: Public Use and
Private Beneficiaries, 16 URB. LAW. 713, 719-21 (1984).
50. Tegeler, supra note 45, at 684; D. CONNERS & E. WODLINER, DEVELOPMENT
EXACTIONS: ATTACK AND DEFENSE

Course of Study Materials 1984);

375-79 (Land Use Regulation and Litigation

ADVISORY GROUP, LINKAGE BETWEEN DOWNTOWN

DEVELOPMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING,

(Report to the Mayor of Boston, Oct.

1983).
51. Werth, Tapping Developers, PLANNING, Jan. 1984, at 21, 23. Because the
payments are spread out over such a long term no actual housing is expected to be built
until 1986. D. MARINO, supra note 46, at 7.
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International Place office complex built by the Chiofaro Company in
downtown Boston. 2
In both San Francisco and Boston there has been considerable
concern about the extent to which state law authorizes these cities to
undertake linkage programs. The contributions in San Francisco have
been negotiated by the planning commission as part of the site plan
review process; there do not appear to have been any cases testing the
validity of this exercise of the power.5 3 In Boston, the program was
established by an ordinance creating a development impact district, but
the advisory group recommended a number of state statutory changes
to assure that the program has proper authorization. An earlier inclusionary program in a suburb of Boston was found to lack statutory
authorization. 4
V.

Federal Law

Linkage programs and their close relatives all involve exactions
imposed on developers for the purpose of solving problems far broader
than any problems created by a particular development. As a vehicle
for examining the federal law issues arising out of linkage programs it
is appropriate to examine in detail a recent Ninth Circuit case arising
out of the City of Klamath Falls, Oregon.
The plaintiff asked Klamath Falls to rezone his land to permit the
construction of 214 garden apartments. Before the plaintiff could develop the property, however, the city needed to vacate some paper
streets that had been dedicated to the city years ago. During negotiations with the city over the plaintiff's request for a street vacation, the
city asked him to dedicate a strip of land for the widening of a city

52. According to an article in the New York Times, this project is expected to
contribute $8.5 million over the next twelve years to the housing trust for neighborhood
development. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1984, at 16, col. 1.
53. See D. CONNERS & E. WODLINGER, supra note 50, at 377. The fact that the
program may be used to construct housing at any price level means that the city must
argue that the construction of any type of housing is a public purpose, even if the
housing is for wealthy people, because of a filter-down process. See Diamond, supra
note 45, at 470.

54. D. MARINO, supra note 46, at 8. See Middlesex of Boston St. Ry. Co. v. Bd.
of Alderman of Newton, 371 Mass. 849, 359 N.E.2d 489 (1976). For a discussion of
potential statutory authority in New York see Comment, Zoning New York City To
Provide Low and Moderate Income Housing: Can Commercial Developers Be Made
To Help?, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 491 (1984).
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street adjacent to his property. Located on this land was a geothermal
well from which plaintiff hoped to obtain steam to heat the apartments
he would be constructing. He offered to dedicate to the city an easement on the surface of the property which would allow the city to
widen the street, but he refused to convey to the city the rights to the
underground well. The city was attempting to set up a geothermal utility district to provide heat and power to the public generally, and the
city refused to vacate the street unless plaintiff conveyed his geothermal well to the city.
The plaintiff brought a section 1983 action in the federal district
court, which ruled in favor of the city on motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, remanding the
case back for trial on all of the major issues. In the process, the court
interpreted the relevant law in a manner quite favorable to the plaintiff, finding that he had stated a valid complaint under the constitutional clauses protecting against the taking of property without compensation, against violations of due process of law, and against denial
55
of equal protection of the laws.
The court treated the case as equivalent to a subdivison exactions
case in which a developer is being asked to contribute land or money in
exchange for needed governmental permission. Citing Supreme Court
decisions on "unconstitutional conditions," the court stated that the
government cannot condition a privilege on a requirement that the applicant give up constitutional rights. In this instance, said the court, the
plaintiff was being asked to give up his property rights in a geothermal
well in exchange for a street vacation. Such a condition would be acceptable only if there were some reasonably identifiable connection between the city's need for the geothermal well and the purpose underlying the law requiring permits for street vacations. Finding no such
relationship, the court ruled that plaintiff had stated a valid claim
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for violations of due
process, equal protection and taking of property without just
compensation.
The court's rationale effectively transforms every subdivision exaction case into a potential claim under section 1983, which can be used
to obtain damages and attorney's fees for successful plaintiffs and can
be brought in either the state or federal courts. The availability of
damages and attorney's fees substantially increases the stakes for local
55.

Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
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governments in exactions cases. Formerly, if local governments incorrectly predicted which exactions a court would approve, the penalty
was usually only the return to the developer of the property or money
exacted. Moreover, in states like California, which is within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the state courts have
been highly unreceptive to developers' complaints about the dramatic
increases in development fees and taxes that have been instituted following Proposition 13. Under the logic of the Parks opinion, these cases
can now be brought in the federal courts where the developer may find
56
a more sympathetic ear.
The majority's analysis in Parks v. Watson57 is substantially identical under both the taking and equal protection clauses. In Parks a
taking was found because the well donation requirement "had no rational relationship to any public purpose related to the vacation of the
public streets," 58 and a violation of equal protection was found because
the well donation requirement "is totally unrelated to [the City's] statutorily defined interest in determining whether to . . . [vacate the
streets] .,,5
Surpisingly perhaps, the court did not consider whether under the
Loretto test a "permanent physical occupation" of the well was being
demanded by the city. 60 Ironically, the application of such a test might
have the effect of inhibiting some of the most traditional forms of exactions, including the dedication of internal streets in a subdivision, while
leaving linkage programs untouched.6 1 Instead, the court applied the
taking clause indirectly, through the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, by analogizing the case to one involving subdivision exactions.
The court discussed the older Illinois rule and, as its counterpart, a
56. See also Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, __ U.S. -,
104 S. Ct. 151 (1983). In regard to potential
abstention by the Ninth Circuit in land use cases, compare Playtime Theaters, Inc. v.
City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. granted,U.S. -,
105
S. Ct. 2015 (1985), with Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir.
1984).
57. 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
58. Id. at 655.
59. Id. The dissenting judge viewed the street vacation as a conveyance of public
property rather than the issuance of a permit, and would have upheld the city's actions
under the broad discretion given to a public body to negotiate the price of property it
sells. Id. at 665-69 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
61. See Costonis, Presumptions and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model For
the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 494 and n.120 (1983).
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California case that requires only that the exaction have some relationship to the needs created by the subdivision. The court summarized its
discussion by saying that "there is agreement among the states 'that
the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the needs
created by the sub-division.' "62 The court cited as examples of interests
having at least some relationship to street vacation the "control of traffic, pollution or access." 63
Whether the Parks opinion is part of an emerging trend toward
more serious analysis of the rational relationship of governmental regulations to the purposes they purport to serve remains to be seen. Recent
Supreme Court decisions, such as Zobel v. Williams,64 in which the
court found no rational basis for an Alaska law apportioning surplus
mineral income among the state's residents on the basis of the length of
time they have lived in the state, and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 5 in which the court found no rational basis for special
restrictions on homes for retarded people, can be analyzed as cases in
which the Court saw no adequate linkage between the government regulation and the public purpose to be served. 66 Professor John Costonis
has also recently argued that the Supreme Court's taking clause decisions pay special attention to the linkage between the purpose of the
regulation and the use of the affected property. 7 When such a linkage
is absent, he argues, the Court is more likely to find a regulation invalid because it is "loading up on one individual more than his just share
of the burdens of government ... .

62. Parks, 716 F.2d at 653 (quoting Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217,
220 (Utah 1979)).
63. Parks, 716 F.2d at 651 n.l.
64. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422, 442 (1982)(Blackmun, J., concurring). See also id. at 444 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
65. 53 U.S.L.W. 5022, 105 S. Ct.
(1985).
66. See also Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 53 U.S.L.W. 4827 105 S. Ct.
(1985); Williams v. Vermont, 53 U.S.L.W. 4659, 105 S. Ct. - (1985); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 53 U.S.L.W. 4399, 105 S. Ct. - (1985).
67. Costonis, supra note 61, at 486-88. But see Tarlock, Regulatory Takings,
Cm. KENT L. REV. 23, 33 (1984). Professor John Humbach would find no taking
whenever linkage-related affirmative obligations were imposed on a developer.
Humbach, A Unifying Theory For the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation
and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 278-79 (1982).
68. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 313 (1893), quoted
in Costonis, supra note 61, at 486. Professor Costonis cites Prune Yard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) and Penn Central Transport Co. v. City of New
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Although neither of these trends can be described as well established, they suggest that it is at least worthwhile to examine developer
exactions against a more rigorous standard of "reasonable relationship"
to determine whether certain types of exactions are more likely to be at
risk than others.
The conventional forms of developer exactions seem relatively safe
under this type of scrutiny, assuming that the cost to the developer does
not reach the degree of magnitude necessary to constitute a denial of
all beneficial use of the land - a test not easily found to be violated. 9
Even exactions for less traditional public services might well be upheld
if the services were in fact needed by the proposed development. If an
impact fee for geothermal heat distribution were imposed at the time of
development approval, and if the city were in fact proposing to supply
geothermal heat to the development, a court might well find a reasonable relationship between the regulation and the exaction."0
In summary, more rigorous scrutiny of the rational relationship
test may make it difficult to justify exactions designed to resolve broad
public problems for which the specific development proposal of the particular developer bears no real blame in a cost accounting sense. And,
whether by coincidence or otherwise, this construction of the constitutional standard seems to parallel a similar trend in the state courts toward putting some real teeth in the rational nexus standard.

VI.

State Law

In a field such as land use law, where the courts of different states
take widely varying positions, it is risky to generalize on the prospects
of a new regulatory technique. Nevertheless, there do seem to be some
common trends in the analysis of development exactions by the courts
of a number of prominent states. An examination of these trends may
yield some useful speculation on the way that state courts will deterYork, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) as the only recent "affirmations of this principle.
69. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 355 (1980); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). But cf. Hamilton Bank of Johnson County v. Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53
U.S.L.W. 3235 (Oct. 1, 1984). If the court were to treat these exactions as permanent
physical occupations, however, the result might not be the same. See Loretto, 458 U.S.
at 419.
70. In Parks v. Watson, the city had granted the plaintiff's petition to rezone the
property to allow more residential use, apparently without imposing any exactions at
the time. 716 F.2d at 649.
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mine the validity of linkage programs. In addition, recent decisions
from Utah, Texas and Florida will be examined as precursors of a new
level of analysis may have a significant impact on the validity of the
various types of linkage programs.
Over the past twenty years the courts of virtually all of the states
have come to use the term "rational nexus" to describe the test used to
measure the validity of development exactions. The early court decisions adopting the rational nexus formulation were viewed by most
commentators as a liberation of local governments from the strictures
of earlier rules.7 1 The scholars who first proposed the test saw it as a
"cost-accounting approach" that would make it "possible to determine
the costs generated by new residents and thus to avoid charging the
newcomers more than a proportionate share. '72 The succeeding years
witnessed a number of opinions, particularly in California, that applied
the rational nexus test to uphold exactions using the loosest possible
type of nexus.7 3 This led some commentators to treat the rational nexus
test much like the rational basis test for equal protection-as a test the
government always passes.7 4 At other times the court decisions incorporating the rational nexus test seemed to use it in such a widely varying
manner that the term seems to represent nothing more than a loosening
of the more restrictive standards used to evaluate the financing of local
improvements through special assessments. More recently, however,
courts have begun to put more meat on the rational nexus bones so that
it becomes the basis for fairly rigorous analysis, in the manner that its
original proponents intended, rather than a slogan used to justify any
currently popular municipal policy.
The more rigorous version of the rational nexus test, as currently
applied, requires a two-part analysis. First, it requires some real showing that the particular development will create a "need" and that the
amount of the exaction bears some roughly proportional relationship to

71.

See R. FREILICH & P. LEvI, MODEL SUPERVISION REGULATIONS: TEXT AND
124-28 (1975).
72. Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Costs on
New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1118, 1137
COMMENTARY

(1964).
73. See, e.g., Liberty v. Calif. Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1981); J.W. Jones Co. v. City of San Diego, 157 Cal. App. 745, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 580 (1984); Kalaydjian v. City of Los Angeles, 149 Cal. App. 3d 690, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 149 (1983).
74. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1212-13; Williams, Planning Law In
the 1980's: What Do We Know About It?, 7 VERMONT L. REV. 205, 228 (1982).
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the share of the overall need that is contributed by this particular development. 75 The second part of the test requires that the funds or
property exacted from the developer be earmarked to be used in a way
that provides some degree of "benefit" to the development from which
the exaction was received. 76 When the exaction relates to traditional
public services and facilities usually provided to new residential development, the courts have generally accepted the proposition that the
new development causes some need for new facilities such as streets,
sewers, water, parks, and schools." Where the exaction is for some
more exotic service or facility, such as the geothermal well involved in
Parks, the courts may conclude that no need exists and reject the validity of the exaction without going futher."8
If some need is found, however, the court proceeds to analyze the
relationship between the amount of the exaction and the share of the
overall need contributed by the particular development. Using this
analysis, recent court decisions have tended to scrutinize closely one
commonly-practiced type of development exaction: the demand that developers contribute right-of-way for major thoroughfares adjoining
their developments. Thus, where the government seeks to build or
widen a major highway through a developing area and the landowners
are asked to contribute the right-of-way as a condition to receiving development approval, the courts are increasingly willing to measure the
share of total traffic to be carried by the highway that is to be contributed by the proposed development. If there is not some reasonable degree of proportionality between the amount of land exacted for the

75. See, e.g., Billings Properties Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 3031, 394 P.2d 182, 187-88 (1964); Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay Inc.
v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); Call
v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 602, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
76. Hayes v. City of Albany, 7 Or. App. 277, 280, 490 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1971);
City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984); Contractors and Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976); Call v. City of
West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d
888, 900 (Wyo. 1983). See Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer To Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 415, 432 (1981).
77. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d at 217; Billings Properties,Inc., 144 Mont. at

25, 394 P.2d at 182; City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 314.
78. For background on the planning implications of geothermal energy, and in
particular the resources of Klamath Falls, see Pasqualetti, The Site Specific Nature of
Geothermal Energy: The Primary Role of Land Use Planningin Nonelectric Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 795, 802-03 (1983).
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highway and the share of the traffic demand contributed by the proposed development the courts will invalidate the exaction.79 One court
recently adopted a rule-of-thumb that developers may be asked to contribute land for highways transsecting their development but not for
highways on the fringes thereof, a test which would hardly withstand
rigorous economic analysis but may bear some common-sense relationship to the type of distinction the court is seeking to draw. s0
Although the demand for proportionality has resulted in the invalidation of some exactions, the widespread use of the rational nexus test
as a means of evaluating all exactions has broadened the scope of facilities and services for which exactions can be used. Instead of applying a
particular rule for streets and another rule for parks, courts have effectively held that an exaction can be levied for any service or facility for
which a proportional share of need can be proven. 8 ' This broadening of
the scope of exactions plays an important role in the development of
linkage programs.
As the second part of the rational nexus test, the courts have been
insisting that the local government demonstrate that the exacted funds
or property will actually be used for the benefit of the development. In
a recent case the Supreme Court of Arkansas declined to enforce an
exaction for parks because the local government had not demonstrated
that it had a plan to spend the funds. The Court, therefore, could not
ascertain whether the funds would be spent for the benefit of the development.8 2 Similarly, a Florida court approved an exaction for parks
only after examining extensive evidence demonstrating that the funds
would be allocated in a manner that would provide a reasonably pro83
portional degree of benefit to all persons contributing to the fund.
The test described above is a rough generalization which ignores
nuances of state law even in those states that seem to conform to the
rational nexus test-not to mention the peculiar legal rules that still
may be applicable elsewhere. It is worthwhile, therefore, to look individually at a few states. Texas, Utah and Florida are each rapidly
79. Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 821, 379
A.2d 200, 204 (1977).
80. Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Va. -,
318 S.E.2d 407,
414-15 (1984). See Howard County v. JJM Inc., Md. _, 482 A.2d 908, 920-21
(1984).
81. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 76, at 419.
82. City of Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc., 280 Ark. 484, 659 S.W.2d 505 (1983).
83. Hollywood Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So.2d 606, 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
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growing Sun Belt states in which there have been a number of significant development exaction decisions in the last three years.
An intermediate Texas court of appeals attracted national attention in 1980 when it held that "parks are not necessarily beneficial to a
community or neighborhood" and therefore struck down as invalid on
its face an ordinance imposing an exaction for parks. 84 The case apparently eventually attracted the attention of the Supreme Court of Texas
because, when in 1984 the court of appeals issued another similar opinion, the Supreme Court of Texas granted a writ of error and reversed
the court of appeals. 85
In its opinion the Texas Supreme Court upheld the general principle of development exactions and announced that it would use the rational nexus test in evaluating them. It remanded the case to the trial
court to allow the developer to present evidence that the exaction created a disproportionate burden on its particular development. The court
set out guidelines for the trial court in making that determination, saying that the developer must demonstrate that there is no reasonable
connection between the increased population arising from the development and the increased park and recreational needs of the neighborhood 86 In addition, the trial court was instructed to consider the benefit to the subdivision from the exactions in order to constrain the reach
of the municipality and ensure that the subdivision receives relief from
a perceived need. The court noted that "unless the court considers the
benefit, a city could, with monetary exactions, place a park so far from
the particular subdivision that the residents receive no benefit, ' ' 87 citing
as examples of the type of evidence that the trial court may consider
"size of lots in the subdivision, the economic impact on the subdivision," and "the amount of open land consumed by the development." 8 8
The Utah Supreme Court has recently gone even further in analyzing the factors that should be considered in evaluating the validity of
a development exaction. In Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 9 the court stated that the total depreciated value of the existing capital system for providing the particular service or facility
84. Berg Dev. Co. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980).
85. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984),
rev'g 666 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Ct. App.).
86.

City of College Station, 680 S.W.2d at 806-07.

87. Id. at 807.
88. Id.
89.

631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
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should be the starting point in determining the validity of any exaction,
whether for a centralized facility like a sewage treatment plant or for
dispersed facilities like parksY0 The exaction must bear some relationship to the size of the new development as a proportion of all developments served by the facilities, except that "extraordinary costs in serving the new development" may also be considered. 9 ' In a subsequent
opinion the court emphasized that the methods of financing the existing
capital facilities needed to be examined to ensure that new development
would be credited with any other contributions that they would be
making to the cost of the services or facilities, such as through tax
revenue user charges or other payments collected from the entire municipality (including the new development). 9 0
The Florida courts have also recently decided a series of important
cases relating to development exactions. The Florida courts have
adopted a rational nexus standard akin to that used now in the majority of states and have made it clear that they will examine the evidence
in some detail to determine whether an appropriate nexus exists. A
1976 Florida Supreme Court decision involving a fee for a proportional
share of the capital expansion costs of a sewage treatment plan, Contractors and Builders Association of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin,93 and a subsequent district court decision on remand,9 4 set forth
the tests that have subsequently been applied to uphold the validity of
impact fees of Florida. 95
In Dunedin, the city ordinance imposing an impact fee of $325 per
dwelling unit for water facilities and $375 per dwelling unit for sewer
facilities was challenged as an ultra vires attempt by the city to tax. In
upholding the concept of impact fees, the Florida Supreme Court made
clear that local government may require a new user of public facilities
to pay a fair share of the costs imposed by new use of the system. More
specifically, the Supreme Court established three standards for a valid
impact fee ordinance:
1. New development must require that the present system of pub90. Id.
91. Id. at 904.
92. Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1982); Banberry Dev.
Corp., 642 P.2d at 904.
93. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
94. Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 358
So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
95. See generally J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, FLORIDA LAND USE RESTRICTIONS ch. 17 (1984).
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lic facilities be expanded;
2. The fees imposed on users must be no more than what the local
government unit would incur in accommodating the new users of the
system; and
3. The fees must be expressly earmarked for the purposes for
which they were charged.96
The Supreme Court rejected older Florida cases, which had used a
standard more appropriate to special assessments, by authorizing an
impact fee for a proportionate share of public facilities that benefitted
the public generally. Three district court of appeal opinions handed
down in 1983 extended the permissible uses of local government impact
fees and more clearly established the tests under which local impact
fees in Florida will be held valid.
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County97 involved a fee required to be
paid to the county as a condition of plat approval, to be used for the
capital costs of expanding the county-wide park system. Under the
challenged ordinance, a subdivider has the option (with the agreement
of the county) of dedicating land, a fee-in-lieu of land which otherwise
would be dedicated, or a fee determined by a schedule based on the
number and size of dwelling units to be built.
Under the standards established by Dunedin, the court found the
ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police power. Impact fees or
dedication requirements are permissible, the court found, if they show
a "reasonable connection" or "rational nexus" in two ways: (1) the fees
offset needs sufficiently attributable to the growth in population generated by the subdivision, and (2) the funds collected are sufficiently
earmarked for the substantial benefit of the subdivision residents. By
adhering to these two tests, "local governments can shift to new residents the reasonable capital costs incurred on their account."9' 8
Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd.99 involved an ordinance
requiring developers to deed land or pay a fee before final approval of
development plans for the purpose of acquiring open space and park
land. The Second District Court of, Appeal remanded the case to the
trial court to apply the tests established in Hollywood, Inc. The court
specifically stated that the fees must be shown to offset, but not exceed,

96. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d at 317-18 (1976).
97. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), petition for review denied, 440 So.
2d 352 (Fla. 1983).
98. Id. at 611.
99. 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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reasonable needs attributable to the new subdivision residents, and
must be adequately earmarked for capital assets that will sufficiently
benefit the new residents. 10 0
Home Builders and Contractors Ass'n. of Palm Beach County v.
Board of Palm Beach County Commissioners10 ' was decided seven
months after Hollywood, Inc. In this case the Fourth District upheld
an impact fee for road improvements. The Palm Beach ordinance required new land development activity generating road traffic (including
residential, commercial and industrial uses) to pay a fair share of the
cost of expanding new roads attributable to the new development. The
developer could pay according to a formula based on the costs of road
construction and the number of motor vehicle trips generated by different types of land use. Alternatively, a developer could submit his own
study of his fair share of the road costs. Funds collected were placed in
a trust fund for expenditure in one of forty zones established throughout the county in which the development is located.
The court found that the draftsmen of the Palm Beach County
ordinance had "Dunedin's lessons in mind." The court adopted the
principles set forth in the leading article by Juergensmeyer and Blake,
and stated that it saw no reason why the same principles should not
apply to roads. 0 2 The court held that the improvements paid for by the
ordinance need not be used exclusively or overwhelmingly for those
who pay so long as they bear a reasonable relationship to the needs
created by the subdivision. The Palm Beach County expenditure zone
system met this test. 0 3
The validity of the fees, as recognized by Florida cases, is judged
by methods of assessment and expenditure. The local government must
demonstrate that the need for the fee is created by new growth (and
the fee does not exceed the cost of the new growth) and that the funds
collected are earmarked for the benefit of the new residents who pay.
At the same time, the courts have accepted the use of a generalized
methodology to meet these tests. For example, the Palm Beach County

100. Id. at 576 (case settled prior to a new trial).
101. 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
102. Id. at 145 (quoting Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 76, at 440-41). The
Florida Supreme Court had earlier held that both sewage treatment and county roads
had countywide benefit for the purpose of interpreting a state constitutional provision
allowing counties to use property taxes from incorporated areas only for services and
facilities of countywide benefit. See City of St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Assoc.,
239 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970); Burke v. Charlotte County, 286 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1973).
103. Home Builders, 446 So.2d at 145.
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zone system was sufficient, as was the Broward County proof of park
usage patterns, to show that new residents would be sufficiently benefitted by the fees.
The Florida legislature has reinforced these court decisions with
new legislation encouraging local governments to use development exactions to meet local facility needs. Local governments that seek to attract major developments will be required to exact from each new development its proportionate share of all facilities needed "to
accomodate any impacts having a rational nexus" to the development.10 4 Failure to impose such requirements on all developers will prevent local governments from approving developments of regional impact unless either the developer or the local government remedy all
impacts themselves 0 " - a condition unlikely to be feasible if major
facilities are involved.
Texas, Utah and Florida have grown more rapidly between 1980
and 1983 than any other state having a population over one million.106
Each of these states has recognized that development exactions can be
a valid and effective means of coping with that growth, but that judicial supervision is needed to ensure that exactions remain within reasonable limits. The courts of these states have followed the modern
trend of limiting exactions not by any arbitrary rules regarding the nature of the facilities or the type of development, but by requiring a
showing that the exaction is proportionate to the share of need for new
facilities created by the new development.
VII.

The Nexus of Linkage

How will linkage programs fare under the more rigorous analysis
required by the evolving test of rational nexus? Those local governments that merely see the development industry as a deep pocket for
general government program are likely to be disappointed. But local
governments which carefully analyze the development process and limit
their demands to those that can be justified by that analysis should be
able to expand exactions beyond their traditional usage for streets, sewers and parks to include housing-related programs. In determining
whether the rationale of the exactions cases will support linkage pro104. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(15)(e)(1) (1985).
105. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(15)(e)(2) (1985).
106. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
(1985).
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grams, it is first necessary to determine whether housing is for some
reason an inappropriate public program for which an exaction may be
levied. If not, the linkage programs need to be tested against the traditional nexus methodology.
Modern courts have suggested few limitations on the range of public facilities and services for which exactions may be used. The separate
line of cases regarding parks, street and utilities have now fused into a
single theory applied to all public services and facilities. 10 7 Although
some types of public service, such as police and fire protection, are
much less capital-intensive than streets and parks, and thus tend to
generate only modest exactions, the capital component of even such
"diffuse" services can be analyzed under the rational nexus test.108 In
any event, housing is as capital-intensive as the programs for which
exactions have traditionally been used. Therefore, the underlying rational nexus theory itself poses no limitations on the range of public
facilities and services to which it can be applied.
Even though the methodology can be applied, it can be argued
that public policy or specific constitutional guarantees should limit the
use of exactions for certain types of facilities. For example, some services such as police and fire protection are so basic or essential to public safety that too precise an apportionment of their cost might detract
from a uniform commitment to protection. 10 9 Other services such as
public education have traditionally been "free" to the users and state
constitutional guarantees of free education may affect the validity of
any fee or user charge for education.11 0 It is clear, however, that there
is no similar right to housing under the federal constitution 1 or under
the constitutions of states other than New Jersey. 11 2 Thus a constitu107. Exactions cases originated in separate lines involving subdivision exactions
and utility charges, but modern courts now regularly apply the same principles to both
areas. See, e.g., Billings Properties, Inc., 144 Mont. at 30-31, 394 P.2d at 187-88;
Lafferty, 642 P.2d at 379; Town of Longboat Key, 433 So. 2d at 574.
108. In dicta the California Supreme Court has questioned whether exactions
should be used to finance "the more general or diffuse need created for such areawide
services as fire and police protection." Associated Homebuilders of Greater East Bay,
Inc., 4 Cal. 3d at 633, 484 P.2d at 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
109.

See Emerson College v. City of Boston,

__

Mass.

,

462 N.E. 2d 1098,

1106 (1984).
110. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("Adequate provision shall be made by
law for a uniform system of free public schools. .. ").
111. J. NOVAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 825-26

(1983).
112. The New Jersey Constitution has been interpreted to require local governPublished by NSUWorks, 1985

27

Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1

Nova Law Journal

[Vol. 9

tional claim based on a right to have new housing constructed seems to
have little chance of success.
Could it be argued that public policy requires that low-income
housing be constructed with funds derived from general revenue
sources? Public construction of housing for the poor is so recent a phenomenon that no such tradition exists. Some commentators suggest, in
fact, that it is bad policy for the government to construct subsidized
housing at all, arguing that such subsidies reduce the mobility that
lower income families need in order to follow job opportunities. 13 The
federal government is currently instituting a housing voucher program
based on this rationale." 4 But state and local governments, with federal
support, continue to subsidize housing through such programs as mortgage revenue bonds, which increasingly benefit the middle range of the
market as well as the lower range.1 5 Even the strongest opponents of
the policy behind such housing programs would be unlikely to claim
that they exceed government powers." 6 Given the wide range of
sources from which housing is subsidized there seems to be no policy
reason why exactions could not be used as another source.
On balance, although one may question the wisdom of subsidizing
housing construction through linkage programs, the fact that the output is housing does not present any compelling legal reason why the
tests used to evaluate other development exactions may not be applied
to such programs.

ments to undertake "affirmative measures" to meet lower income housing needs. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Twp of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390, 442
(1983). No other state seems to impose such a requirement. Although the California
Supreme Court has expressed concern about the effect of land use controls on regional
housing needs, Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976), and the legislature

of that state has mandated planning to meet housing needs.

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT

§§ 65580 if. (1983), the local governments of that state are under no real pressure to undertake affirmative measures to provide housing. See Building Industry Ass'n
of Southern California v. City of Camarillo, 213 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1985). See also the
New York judicial rhetoric most recently expressed in Blitz v. Town of New Castle,
463 N.Y.S. 2d 832 (1983).
113. See generally R. STRUYK & M. BENDICK, HOUSING VOUCHERS FOR THE
POOR: LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT (1981).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 f(o) (1984).
115. Peterson & Muller, Housing Cost Reduction Through The Tax Exempt
Market in HOUSING SUPPLY & AFFORDABILITY 249, 251-53 (Urban Land Inst. 1983).
116. Ellickson, Inclusionary Housing Programs: Another Misguided Urban Policy (unpublished paper for CUNY Symposium, Nov. 14, 1983).
CODE
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The extent to which exactions may be imposed for housing-related

linkage programs should depend on the local government's ability to
show (1) that there is a need for housing, (2) that the need is caused by
new development, (3) that the exaction is proportional to the need
caused, (4) that the exaction will be used to remedy the need, and (5)
that the remedy will benefit the occupants of the new development.

Both Boston and San Francisco experience a high demand for
housing, and few would argue that these cities meet any objective test

for housing need.11 7 Other cities, however, may have a difficult time
meeting such a test, particularly if they are experiencing a net outflow

of population." 8
Assuming that a need for housing exists, what is its cause? Proof
of causation in the development process is no simple matter and can be
the source of endless debate. The key issue is the determination of what
causes a need for new housing. San Francisco and Boston both believe
that the need for housing is stimulated by the new employment that
results from the construction of new office buildings. 11 9 This argument

has been challenged at both tiers of its logic. Does the construction of
office buildings create jobs? Do jobs create a need for housing?
San Francisco economist Claude Gruen argues that "additions to
the supply of office space don't make office employment any more than
cribs made babies.' 120 Any private developer of speculative facilities,
117. See Griffin, Jr., Inclusionary Housing and Linkage in Boston and Cambridge, Mass. 12 (unpublished paper presented at Urban Land Institute conference on
"Downtown Linkage," New York City, April 11, 1985); Gruen, A Case History of the
San Francisco Office-Housing Linkage Program 2-4 (unpublished paper presented at
Urban Land Institute conference on "Downtown Linkage," New York City, April 11,
1985).
118. The Chicago planning department, in exploring the advantages and disadvantages of an exactions program, reported that between 1970 and 1980 the City of
Chicago lost roughly 6,100 dwelling units per year to fire and demolition and gained
5034 units per year of new construction, for a net loss of 1066 units per year, while
population declined at the rate of about 36,500 people per year. CITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING, STAFF REPORT ON EXACTIONS 13-14 (June, 1985).
119. See Agnost, Conditioning Approval of Commercial Development on the
Construction of Affordable Housing - The San Francisco Experiment (unpublished
paper for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers Conference, October 30,
1984).
120. Gruen, The Economics of Requiring Office Space Development to Contribute to the Productgion and/or Rehabilitation of Housing, 8 (unpublished paper
presented at Urban Land Institute conference on "Downtown Linkage," New York
City, April 11, 1985).
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whether office or retail or housing, can argue that the facilities themselves do not create the demand - they are only responding to a demand caused by overall economic conditions. The argument is reminiscent of the slogan "guns don't kill people, people kill people," which
suggests that an instrumentality is being forced unfairly to bear the
blame that should be attached to the operator. The equivalent of the
trigger-puller is the in-migrant. Is it the in-migrant who causes the impact? If so, should he or she bear the burden directly?
In a chain of causation it is always possible to argue that the preceding link should bear responsibility. An argument that development
does not cause economic impact, however, would also undermine the
public purpose behind such programs for subsidizing development as
industrial revenue bonds and tax increment financing. Whatever philosophical merits this argument may or may not have, it has garnered
little judicial support."' The Supreme Court has exhibited increasing
concern about discrimination against out-of-state residents, but has
thus far restricted its concern to regulations having a direct rather than
an indirect impact on outsiders.122 Should the court begin to examine
the indirect effect of development financing methods on interstate migration it will be necessary to re-examine not only linkage programs
but other well accepted types of user charges and development
exactions.123
If the argument that development creates new jobs is accepted,
one reaches the issue of whether the new jobs create a need for new
housing. The answer is not as simple as it appears. Jobs come and go in
a never-ending stream as businesses open and close, expand and contract. The peculiar value of cities may stem from the very flexibility
with which their job market can respond to constant change.1 24 In such
an environment, the addition of any new job does not necessarily mean
that the net number of jobs is increased because the job may have been
transferred from another location in the community. If the business is
moving to promote efficiency in operation, on balance more jobs may
have been lost than gained, which would suggest that future out-migra121. See, e.g., Loup-Miller Constr. Co. v. City and County of Denver, 676 P.2d
1170, 1173-75 (Colo. 1984); J. W. Jones Co. v. City of San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. at
588; Home Builders, 446 So. 2d at 144. See generally J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
N. YOUNG, supra note 11, at 812-16.
122. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
123. See Juergensmeyer & Gregg, Limiting Population Growth in Floridaand
the Nation: The ConstitutionalIssues, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 758, 778-83 (1974).
124. JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 91-100 (1969).
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tion might cause a decline in housing demand.
Even if the total number of jobs does increase, the demand for
housing does not necessarily increase along with it. A city's population
is constantly changing through in-migration and out-migration, birth
and death. Recent years have seen dramatic decreases in average
household size, which has to some extent been accompanied by the
splitting up of larger dwelling units. 125 The existing housing stock is
constantly changing as people build additions or convert housing to
non-residential use or vice versa. New housing units are built while
others are demolished. Few large cities have trustworthy statistical
measures that keep tract of such small-scale changes in the housing
supply as conversions and abandonments.
The complexity of the housing market does not mean that a relationship between jobs and housing cannot be shown, but it does mean
that a fairly sophisticated analysis will be needed to meet the emerging
tests in states like Utah, Texas and Florida. Whether the office-housing
linkage in cities like San Francisco or Boston would be able to pass the
causation element of a modern rational nexus test will depend on
whether the documentation by the planning department of the relationship between office development and the need for housing can survive
the scrutiny of litigation.
The causal connection needed to justify inclusionary zoning programs - that new housing creates a need for new low income housing
is even less clear. Its proponents argue that if developers can be
required to provide streets, sewers and other facilities needed to service
their development they should also be required to provide housing for
the workers who would be needed to operate these facilities and services? If a state accepts even the loosest causal connection as a basis
for development exactions this argument may be satisfactory,126 so it is
125. For example, the average household size in Chicago went from 2.91 people
in 1970 to 2.70 people in 1980 and is projected to go to 2.15 people in 1990. CITY OF
CHICAGO DEPT. OF PLANNING, supra note 118, at 13.
126. Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost
Housing,3 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1015, 1033 (1976); Kleven, supra note 36, at 149798; Hill, Governmental Manipulation of Land Values to Build Affordable Housing:
The Issue of Compensating Benefits, 13 REAL ESTATE L.J. 3, 25-26 (1984). But see
King, InclusionaryZoning: Unfair Response To the Need for Low Cost Housing 4 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 597, 615-28 (1982); Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning,
54 So. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981); A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 36-37; Costonis,

supra note 61, at 489-90. The fact that a "bonus" is offered in connection with the
exaction may be of some value in supporting its validity. See Willams, Jr., On the
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
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not surprising to find that California is the site of many inclusionary
zoning programs.

21

Other states might find it harder to accept the ar-

gument that new housing causes a need for jobs for lower income
28

people.1
If a causal relation between the development and the need for
housing is established, the next step is to measure the proportional
share of the need attributed to the particular development. Would the

linkage programs in Boston and San Francisco meet a test of proportionality? Neither program explicitly credits the new development with
any of the property tax or other revenue it will generate toward potential housing programs. On the other hand, the city may be able to argue that the exaction is so small in relation to the need that even with

Inclination of Developers to Help the Poor: Designing Affirmative Measures to Induce
the Construction of Lower Income Housing after Mt. Laurel II 17-19 (unpublished
paper for Nov. 14, 1983, CUNY Graduate School Symposium); Kleven, Inclusionary
Zoning and the Nexus Issue 8-9 (unpublished paper, CUNY Graduate School Symposium, Nov. 14, 1983).
127. See S. SCHWARTZ & R. JOHNSTON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING: AN EVALUATION OF INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS IN

CALIFORNIA (Inst. of Governmental Affairs, Univ. of California at Davis, Environmen-

tal Quality Services No. 35, December, 1981). The inclusionary program in Orange
County, California, has been frequently cited as an effective one. See Burton, California Legislature Prohibits Exclusionary Zoning, Mandates Fair Share, SAN FERN.
VALLEY L. REV. 19, 34-37 (1981); Bozung, A Positive Response to Growth Control
Plans: The Orange County Inclusionary Housing Program,9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 819
(1982). In 1983, however, the county board voted to phase out the program. See R.
ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 8, at 141 (Supp. 1984), A. MALLACH, supra
note 36, at 251.
128. See Costonis, supra note 61, at 489-91; Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1212;
Tegeler, supra note 45, at 694. Some states, however, have justified inclusionary programs not as an exaction but as an attempt to control the price of housing through
establishment of zoning criteria. Under this theory, the requirement that a certain
share of the housing be for low and moderate income people is merely a "criterion" of
the zoning, just like a requirement that the housing be set back fifty feet from the
street or less than fifty feet high. As the late Donald Hagman put it, if you could
downzone a place so that birds could sing why couldn't you downzone it so that poor
people could sing? Hagman, supra note 30, at 175. See Kleven, supra note 36, at 150206. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, relying on such a theory, explicitly upheld
inclusionary zoning and encouraged its use by New Jersey municipalities. In the matter
of Egg Harbor Associates, 94 N.J. 358, 365, 464 A.2d 1115, 1123 (1983); Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel Two, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
See A. MALLACH, supra note 36, at 30-32, 226-33. For a discussion of the effect of the
Mt. Laurel case on exactions in New Jersey see Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of
Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 851, 874-76 (1984).
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such credits the fee is not disproportionately high.
Finally, the earmarking test must be met. Whether the housing to
be built by the San Francisco and Boston programs will mitigate the
need for low-income housing, and do so in a way that benefits the developments that make the contributions, remains to be seen. In those
states that demand strict assurance in advance on these issues, the programs of both cities may be excessively loose. A more cautiously
designed linkage program would earmark the funds collected in a manner that guarantees that the funds are used to meet the identified need,
and are used in accordance with an overall plan that ensures that the
funds will be spent in a manner that benefits the developments from
which they are collected. It should not be necessary to identify the specific capital project to which each dollar will be devoted, and the lawyer's desire for precise evidence of linkage will undoubtedly need to be
balanced against the administrator's need for flexibility in the use of
funds and the administrative costs associated with the required analysis. These costs can probably be reduced to the extent that the factors
identified can be converted into data that can be automatically
processed.
VIII.

Conclusion

In summary, linkage programs should be required to meet the
same tests that have evolved for measuring the validity of other forms
of development exaction. Under those tests a housing program would
probably be a legally acceptable candidate for an exaction process. The
important factual question that remains to be evaluated is whether an
appropriate method can be established to relate housing need to other
types of development, and for assuring that housing will be built in a
way that provides a reciprocal benefit to that development. Like other
factual questions arising from a judicially-created standard, the answer
can only be found through additional litigation.
Beyond these legal issues, however, important policy questions remain. Charitable giving, whether through the ancient tithe or more
modern institutions, has been enforced through social pressures rather
than legal constraints. Many of the same business institutions that have
been relied on to provide support for housing programs through charitable gifts are now being required to support such programs through
mandatory linkage programs. If the idea of a mandatory tithe becomes
commonplace, it will remain to be seen whether our existing network of
Published by NSUWorks, 1985

33

412

Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1

Nova Law Journal

[Vol. 9

charitable programs can co-exist effectively with a compulsory system
having similar goals.
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Conflicts of Interest Arising Under ERISA's
Fiduciary Standards: Can the Trustee Ever be
Prudent, As Long As He Faces Dual Loyalties?

I.

Introduction to the Conflict of Interest Problem

The drafters of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act'
faced the formidable task of restructuring the regulation of private
pension plans throughout America. It would be unreasonable to assume
that all of the problems inherent to the pre-ERISA pension system
would be resolved by the ERISA enactment and its 1976 amendments.
While Congress did take great steps to establish uniform guidelines imposing fiduciary standards over the plan trustee, 2 it failed to curb all
trustee misconduct.
This note centers on section 408(c)(3) of ERISA, 3 a provision
which permits corporate officers to act as trustees to ERISA pension
plans. Because of the enactment of section 408(c)(3), the potential for
conflicts of interest exists for corporate trustees whose loyalties are divided between the administration of the pension trust fund and the
company's business interests. This problem will continue to expose
ERISA pension plan assets to loss of funds at the hands of an officer/
trustee, who because of his loyalty to his corporation disregards his duties to plan participants. Indeed, an original drafter of ERISA noted
that "even now, despite ERISA, the temptation of parties-in-interest to
attempt to manipulate the assets of Employee Pension Funds for their
own personal or institutional advantage is very great, and especially
great when funds for making capital'4investment or serving other corporate objectives are in short supply."
1. Hereinafter referred to as ERISA.
2. See infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
3. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1982).
4. Retirement Income Incentives Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1541 Before the
Sub. Comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 97 Cong., I Sess.
846-54 (1982)(statement by Michael S. Gordon).
In fact, Congress was aware of numerous examples of "party-in-interest" corruption and abuse prior to ERISA. Accordingly, Michael S. Gordon, an original drafter of
ERISA, recalled the following conflict of interest involving Genesco, Inc.:
In 1962 Genesco, Inc. used its employee pension fund to acquire FlaggPublished by NSUWorks, 1985
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Section 404 of ERISA, the fiduciary standards section, represents
one-half of the dual loyalty that the officer faces and this section commands him to disregard his obligations to the management of the corporation (the second half of his dual loyalty) and act in a prudent fashion to the pension plan." In application it is likely that section
408(c)(3) requires the officer/trustee to ignore corporate profit maximizing goals to better serve the ERISA trust participants.' This artificial expectation asks the officer/trustee to exchange the proverbial activist derby worn by the corporate manager for the more conservative
top hat belonging to Cardozo's prudent man.7 This role change from
Utica Corp., a knitwear manufacturing concern. Flagg-Utica wanted
Genesco stock rather than cash for cash payment to its stockholders would
have been taxable immediately. But rather than buy on the open market,
Genesco dipped into the pension fund for 150,000 shares; it paid the fund
$5,250,000, or an average between the high and low Big Board quotes on
the day chosen for the transaction. By buying the stock from its pension
fund, Genesco probably saved money; if the company had bought so heavily on the stock exchange the market price per share probably would have
climbed, increasing the cost of the purchase. And because management
controlled the fund, Genesco kept control of the $5,250,000; that sum remained available for further acquisitions. Subsequently, Genesco agreed
with the SEC that it would restrict transactions in Genesco securities on
behalf of its Employee Stock Bonus Trust and pension plan as well as restricting purchase by the Company from the stock bonus or pension plans
during negotiations with other companies. Again, the IRS never sought to
challenge the tax-exempt basis of the Genesco pension funds on the basis
of the prohibited transaction rules in the IRS tax regulations that then
existed. Subsequently, hearings before this Subcommittee disclosed that
Genesco had used pension fund assets to finance similar corporate acquisitions, involving complex real estate leaseback transactions. Ultimately,
some of these transactions resulted in serious losses to the plan.
Id. at 853, citing Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study,.1971, Part II, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 599 et seq.
5. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
6. With primary emphasis on a profit maximization goal, the aspiring corporate
officer may take actions and make decisions in a manner that would be judged imprudent under § 404 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104. See generally R. BREALEY AND S. MEYERS, Principles of Corporate Finance 637-47 (1981).
7. See S. REP. No. 93-127 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4680-841, 5073-84. Judge Mishler, in Donovan v. Bierwith,
538 F. Supp. 463, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), modified, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982)(quoting Chief Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928)), observed:
[M]any forms of conduct permissible in a work a day world for those act-
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corporate officer to the prudent trustee cannot reasonably occur without
traces of corporate profit maximizing goals impacting upon each investment decision by the officer/trustee. A conflict of interest occurs when
the officer/trustee succumbs to prudent corporate investment decisions
that are deemed imprudent under ERISA. This note examines this
dual loyalty problem. 8 First, this discussion concerns the historical
background to ERISA's fiduciary standards section. Second, the focus
centers on the fiduciary standard section. Third, the discussion of the
dual loyalty problem turns to common business conditions that create
conflict of interest. Fourth, in contrast to the dual loyalty problem, the
note examines a standard of review that gauges an officer/trustee's administrative decisions. After a consideration of this standard, the study
reviews the potential for inadequate compensation to plan participants
resulting from fiduciary breach. Finally, this note advocates the repeal

ing at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. 'Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior.' As to this there has been a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty
by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions.
Id.
8. The cases discussed in this note involve two types of ERISA pension plans: (1)
the profit sharing plan and (2) the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP or Qualified Pension Plan). The court in Durkee v. Welch, 49 F.2d 339, 341 (S.D. Cal. 1931),
defines a profit sharing plan as follows:
Profit sharing ordinarily signifies the participation of employees with their
employer in a given share of the profits of an enterprise by reason of their
labor and not by reason of their capital investment therein. .

.

. The gen-

eral understanding of a profit-sharing arrangement between employers and
workers is that the worker shall share in the earnings and profits of his
employer, but is not accountable or liable for losses or deficits in the business, and there is also, generally, present in profit-sharing transactions the
element of contribution by the employer to the project.
Id.
See the definition of an ESOP in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1985), which provides for "a
qualified stock bonus plan, or a combination stock bonus plan/money purchase pension
plan, that invests in 'qualified employer securities.'" See generally, 29 CFR §
2550.407d-6(l)(1984). All of the examples of fiduciary breach in the following cases
concern an officer/trustees' investment in equity securities, as opposed to debt instruments. While it is possible for an officer/trustee to invest in certain debentures, that
investment is subject to the Internal Revenue Code's standards set forth in sections
503(e) and 4975(e)(8). Therefore, this note will not discuss the prudency of an officer/
trustee's decision to invest in a debt instrument.
Published by NSUWorks, 1985

37

Nova
Law Law
Review,Journal
Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1
Nova

416

[Vol. 9

of section 408(c)(3) by Congress, and its substitution with a two-tiered
investment counseling requirement based on a formula that considers
the number of employees and the total assets in the plan.9

II.

Historical Background to ERISA's Fiduciary Standards
Section

Congress passed ERISA in response to years of abuse in the area
of private pension and welfare plans. 10 The Act's fiduciary standards
section made "applicable the law of trusts

. .

. [and] established uni-

form fiduciary standards which prevent transactions that dissipate or
endanger plan assets, and provide effective remedies for breaches of
trust."" Historically, misconduct by trustees in the administration of
pension trusts often resulted in the dissipation of plan assets.' 2 Based
on the amount of asset dissipation, the plans lost their tax exempt status, and the I.R.S. imposed penalties which were felt most severely by
plan participants and beneficiaries who found their distributions diminished by an even greater tax burden. 13 In some cases, the entire retirement benefit dissipated as a result of trustee mismanagement.' 4 Prior to
the enactment of ERISA, Congress had examined these problems associated with the administration of private pension funds.' 5 In an attempt
to ameliorate these problems, Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Disclosure Act in 1958,16 and enacted the Labor Management Reporting Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) in 1959.17 Both acts failed to provide adequate legislative regulation over a pension trustee's fiduciary
responsibility to plan participants and their beneficiaries' assets.' 8 In9. See infra note 169.
10.

S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.

CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 5186 (Statement of Sen. Harrison Williams).

11. Id.
12. 19B Business Organizations,S. Young, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans §
17.0111].
13. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4642-43.
14. See supra n.12.
15. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4640-41.
16. Priv. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) amended by Priv. L. No. 87-420,
76 Stat. 35 (1962).
17. Priv. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
18. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4642-43.
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stead of direct fiduciary regulation, Congress left the door open for
courts to develop common-law trust principles that would constitute the
standards by which a plan trustee would be held responsible to pension
participants and their beneficiaries. 19
The drafters of ERISA understood that more precise and stricter
fiduciary standards were necessary to safeguard qualified pension fund
assets.20 Therefore, in 1974, the drafters succeeded in pursuading Congress to recognize that neither the individual states nor the federal government safeguarded employee benefit plan assets from such abuses as
self-dealing, imprudent investing and misappropriation of plan funds. 21
With these policy interests in mind, Congress approved the fiduciary
standard section of ERISA, and enacted a uniform standard
for trust22
ees in the specialized field of employee benefit plans.
III.

The Fiduciary Standards Section and Codified Exceptions

As private pension plans grew in popularity, Congress recognized
the need to regulate a trustee's fiduciary relationship to plan participants.23 Section 404,24 the ERISA fiduciary standards section, signifies
Congress' policy concerns towards curbing runaway trustee mismanagement and misconduct. 25 This section requires that every duty carried out by a plan trustee must be "performed with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the plan participants and for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing benefits to the participants and beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. '26 The
drafters of ERISA designed this fiduciary standard section based on a
19. See Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D. Wis.
1979). See also S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 5186 (Statement of Sen. Harrison Williams).
20. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 4680-841, 5073-84.
21. Id. at 4839-43.
22. Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990-92
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
23. See, S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4680-841, 5073-84.
24. See Retirement Income Incentives Act of 1981: Hearings on S.1541 Before
the Sub. Comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 97 Cong., 1
Sess. 846-54 (1982)(statement by Michael S. Gordon).
25. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4680-841, 5073-84.
26. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
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model that combines the prudent man rule established of common-law
trust and a modern supplement to common-law trust, the diversification
rule. -7
A.

Ambiguity Surrounding the Prudent Man Rule and Diversification Requirement

The court in Harvard College v. Armory, 8 established the common-law standard that now exists in codified form as the prudent man
rule. This rule provides that a trustee:
shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion .... [H]e is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation,
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capi29
tal to be invested.

Congress modified this common-law standard when it enacted its statutory form in section 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. Accordingly, an ERISA
plan fiduciary must discharge his investment duties: "with the care,
skill and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters

would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims." 30
27.

S.REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws 4639, 5084-85.
28. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830) (excusing trustee from liability for investing
in trade company stock).
29. Id. at 461.
30. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1982). Section 1104
dealing with ERISA's Fiduciary Standards provides:
(a)(1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 13423, and 1344 of this title,
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matter would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a
like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the

CONG.
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The ERISA plan officer/trustee, abiding by the prudent man rule,
must make investments consonant to the stated security level of the
trust.31 Often, courts look beyond the success of an investment when
judging whether a trustee has violated the prudent man rule.32 These
courts recognize that "safety in income and principal are usually primary objectives to a qualified pension trust fund . . [and] . . .a prudent investor will not be solely concerned with capital growth." 3 3 The
courts note that even though a trustee has not lost money on an investment, and in fact has received an "extraordinary" return, that does not
preclude a cause of action against the trustee for improperly risking
risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not
to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with
the provisions of this subchapter.
(2) In the case of an eligible individual account plan (as defined in section 1107(d)(3) of this title), the diversification requirement of paragraph
(I)(C) and the prudence requirement (only to the event that it requires
diversification) of paragraph (1)(B) is not violated by acquisitionor holding of qualifying employer realproperty or qualifying employer securities
(as defined in section 1107(d)(4) and (5) of this title).
(b)Except as authorized by the Secretary by regulations, no fiduciary
may maintain the indicia of ownership of any assets of a plan outside the
jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States.
(c)In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over
assets in his account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over
the assets in his account (as determined under regulations of the Secretary) (1) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary
by reason of such exercise, and
(2) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part
for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.
ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982) (emphasis added).
31. G. BOGERT, Law of Trusts § 106, at 388 (1973).
32. See Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D.
Hawaii 1980). "The application of ERISA's prudence standard does not depend upon
the ultimate outcome of an investment, but upon the prudence of the fiduciaries under
the circumstances prevailing when they make their decision and in light of the alternatives available to them." But see American Com. Ass'n v. Retirement Plan, 488 F.
Supp. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), "The mere fact that there may have been a decline in
the value of the Plan's portfolio or a diminution of income in a given year does not by
itself establish imprudent management."
33. A. ScoTT, The Law of Trusts § 227.1 (3d ed. 1967 & 1982 Supp.).
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pension trust assets.3 4 However, the prudent man rule, as it stands in

ERISA's fiduciary standard section, provides little help to the officer/
trustee faced with business conditions that dictate a managerial decision directly opposite to that officer's responsibilities as a trustee.

Added to the problems facing the officer/trustee are the requirements
of the diversification rule.

Unfortunately, the diversification rule fails to alleviate the dilemma faced by the officer/trustee in complying with the prudent man
rule. In pertinent part, the requirement to diversify provides that a plan
trustee must "diversify the investments of the plan so as to minimize
the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly pru-

dent not to do so."5 Ostensibly, the requirement to diversify is an attempt by Congress to harness the discretion of the plan trustee who is

making investment decisions over the assets in the ERISA plan. Interpreting Congress' intent as enacted in the fiduciary standards section of

ERISA, the courts have been unable to produce uniform authority that
would clarify the ambiguity surrounding the requirement to diversify. 6
Although case precedent lacks uniformity in this area, the requirement to diversify remains the best strategy for prudent maintenance of
the trust corpus.37 Theoretically, the officer/trustee should aim to diversify its investment portfolio at a riskless posture, such that high
growth and risky potential investments may be offset by low growth
34.
35.

See supra note 31.
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1982).

36. The Court in Marshall v. Teamsters, 458 F. Supp. at 986, determined that:
In some jurisdictions, lack of diversification is a per se breach of the trustees' investment duty of prudence; in others it is not. Section 404(a)(1)(c)
requires diversification under circumstances where commitment of a high
percentage of the assets of a plan to a particular investment or class of
investments casts doubt on the prudence of the investments.
Teamsters, 458 F. Supp. at 990 (citations omitted).
Compare this finding with the rationale of the court in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, -

U.S.

-,

103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983):

The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call
for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information. The
entrepeneur's function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty,
and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed
years later against a background of perfect knowledge.
Id.

37. See generally Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 JOURNAL OF
Diversificationof Investments, (1952). F.

H. MARKOWITZ, Efficient
VESTMENTS, 633-54 (1982).

91.
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and low risk investments to create a well-balanced base. 38 The courts,
38.

See F. REILLEY, INVESTMENTS 559-77 (1982).

Markowitz showed that the variance of the [investments] rate of return was a meaningful measure of risk under a reasonable set of assumptions and derived the formulas for computing the variance of the portfolio. .

.

. The Markowitz model is based on several assumptions regarding

investor behavior:
(1) Investors consider each investment alternative as being represented by a probability distribution of expected returns over some holding
period.
(2) Investors maximize one-period expected utility and possess utility
curves that demonstrate diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
(3) Individuals estimate risk on the basis of the variability of expected
returns.
(4) Investors base decisions solely on expected return and risk; ie their
utility curves are a function of expected return an variance (or standard
deviation) of returns only.
(5) For a given risk level, investors prefer higher returns to lower returns. Similarly, for a given level of expected return, investors prefer less
risk to more risk.
Id. at 559. Consider the following computation of the expected return for an individual
risky asset and the computation of the expected return of a portfolio.
Potential
Expected
Probability
Return (Pi)(%)
Return (%)
.25
.25
.25
.25

.08
.10
.12
.14

.0200
.0250
.0300
.0350
E(R) = .1100

Weight (Wi)
(%of the portfolio)

Expected
Return (Ri )

Expected Portfolio
Return (Wi X Ri)

.20

.10

.0200

.30
.30
.20

.11
.12
.13

.0330
.0360
.0260
.1150

E(Rportfolio)

=

Variance

=

(a2)

i=1 WiR
[Ri -

E(Ri)] 2 Pi

Ri

= possible (individual investment) rates of return

Pi

=

Wi
= weight (%) of the investment to the total portfolio
E(Ri) = expected rate of return (per individual investment)
probability of the possible rate of return
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however, apply the ERISA diversification requirement on an investment-by-investment basis, 9 which prevents plan trustees from pursuing
progressive portfolio management strategies that could ultimately provide greater return to the plan participant at the same low risk level. 40
Instead of looking at the rate of return earned after the particular investment progresses, courts assess diversification and prudence under
prevailing circumstances taken into account when the investment deciAn envelope curve may be derived and plotted as the result of various combinations of assets and portfolios (given the portfolio expected return and standard deviations of each combination). "The envelope curve that contains the best of all combinations is referred to as the efficient frontier. Specifically, the efficient frontier is that set
of portfolios that has the maximum return for every given level of risk or the minimum risk for every level of return."
Id. at 577 (emphasis supplied).
39. The Markowitz portfolio theory considers the aggregate risk factor of the
portfolio as a measure of the investment manager's performance. Thus, this theory is
not based upon an investment-by-investment analysis. Markowitz, supra note 37, at 7791.
40. Id. See the example set forth in Joy.
Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of the diversified shareholder, the seemingly more risky
alternatives may well be the best choice since great losses in some stocks
will over time be offset by even greater gains in others:
INVESTMENT A
Outcome Profit
or Loss
+15
+ 1
-13

Estimated Probability
of Outcome
.4
.4
.2
1.0

Value
6.0
.4
-2.6
3.8

INVESTMENT A
Outcome Profit
Estimated Probability
Value
or Loss
of Outcome
2.4
+ 6
.4
.8
+ 2
.4
.2
+ 1
.2
3.4
1.0
Although A is clearly 'worth' more than B, it is riskier because it is
more volatile. Diversification lessens the volatility by allowing investors to
invest in 20 or 200 A's which will tend to guarantee a total result near the
value. Shareholders are thus better off with the various firms selecting A
over B, although after the fact they will complain in each case of the 2.6
loss.
Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 note 6 (quoting
147-49 (1980)).
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sion began."1 This ambiguity between an accepted theory of finance
and judicial practice hinders the progressive officer/trustee seeking

high rates of return with slightly higher risk levels, because an investment-by-investment analysis will reject high risk projects at an earlier
stage than if the court had viewed that investment's risk factor in light

of the overall risk of the portfolio.42
The conflict between prudent trust practices and prudent corporate-profit maximization goals exists despite the issuance of a Department of Labor regulation which attempts to define practical implementation for the diversification requirement.43 Although the Code of
Federal Regulations purports to illustrate factors that are consonant

with modern portfolio diversification theories, some of these elements
are incompatible to the judiciary's investment-by-investment analysis of
a trustee's capital spending decisions.44 Combined with the prudent
41. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System, 47 F. Supp. 1248, 1255 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
42. See Markowitz, supra note 37 at 77-91.
43. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(B)(1) (1984)(investment duties). In pertinent part,
this Department of Labor regulation declares that:
(b) Investment Duties. (1) With regard to an investment or investment
course of action taken by a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan pursuant
to his investment duties, the requirement of section 1104 (a)(1)(B) of the
Act set forth in subsection (a) of this section is satisfied if the fiduciary:
(i) has given appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances
that, given the scope of such fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary
knows or should know are relevant to the particular investment or investment course of action involved, including the role of investment or investment course of action plays in that portion of the plan's investment portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties; and (ii) has
acted accordingly.
2(ii) Consideration of the following factors as they relate to such portion
of the portfolio:
(A) The compensation of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(B) The liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash flow requirements of the plan; and
(C) The projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan.
44. In particular, § 2550.404a-l(b)(2)(ii)(C), when read alone, might allow
clearance to invest in a high risk security that complements the projected (expected)
return of the portfolio. But, an "investment by investment" approach could reject the
same investment.
Congress' endeavor to clarify its own diversification requirement was noted in the
legislative history:
The degree of investment concentration that would violate this requirePublished by NSUWorks, 1985
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man rule, this regulatory contradiction tends to increase the number of

the conflicting standards of fiduciary conduct that confront the officer/
trustee.45
B.

Prohibited Transactions - Section 406

In addition to its fiduciary standard section, ERISA is designed to
prohibit transactions that involve transfers between an ERISA trustee
and a party-in-interest.46 Specifically, a fiduciary shall not:
ment to diversify cannot be stated as a fixed percentage, because a prudent
fiduciary must consider the facts and circumstancesof each case. The factors to be considered include (1) the purposes of the plan; (2) the amont of
the plan assets; (3) financial and industrial conditions; (4) the type of investment, whether mortgages, bonds or shares of stock or otherwise; (5)
distribution as to geographical location; (6) distribution as to industries;
(7) the dates of maturity.
S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEWS 4639, 5084-85 (emphasis added).
45. Compare this finding with Teamsters, 458 F. Supp. at 986.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1982) defines a "party-in-interest" as:
(A) any fiduciary (including but not limited to, any administrator, officer, trustee, or custodian), counsel, or employee of such employee benefit
plan;
(B) a person providing services to such plan;
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan;
(D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by
such plan;
(E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of(i) the combined voting power of all ...
(ii) the capital interest or the profits interest in a partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise,
which is an employer or an employee organization described in subparagraph (C) or (D);
(F) a relative (as defined in paragraph 15 of any individual described in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E);
(G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate of which (or in which)
50 percent or more of (i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or (iii) the beneficial trust of such trust or estate is owned directly or
indirectly, or held by persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C),
(D), or (E);
(H) an employee, officer, director (or an individual having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers or directors), or a 10 percent or
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(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or his own
account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction
involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose
interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of
its participants or beneficiaries, or
(3) receive any consideration for his own personal account from
any party dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction
47
involving the assets of the plan.

more shareholder directly or indirectly, of a person described in subparagraph (B), (C), (D), (E), or (G), or of the employee benefit plan; or
(I) a 10 percent or more (directly or indirectly in a capital or profits)
partner or joint venturer of a person described in subparagraph (B), (C),
(D), (E), or (G).
The Secretary, after consultation and coordination with the Secretary
of the Treasury, may by regulation prescribe a percentage lower than 50
percent for subparagraph (E) and (G) and lower than 10 percent for subparagraph (H) or (I). The Secretary may prescribe regulations for determining the ownership (direct or indirect) of profits and beneficial interests,
and the manner in which indirect stockholdings are taken into account.
Any person who is a party in interest with respect to a plan to which a
trust described in § 501(c)(22) of Title 26 is permitted to make payments
under § 1403 of this title shall be treated as a party in interest with respect
to such trust.
47. ERISA § 406(b)(1-3), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1-3) (1982). In addition to §
1106, the Internal Revenue Code provides for a tax on prohibited transactions. In pertinent part, the I.R.C. taxes a "disqualified person" on each prohibited transaction.
§ 4975. Tax on prohibited transactions
(a) Initial taxes on disqualifiedperson. - There is hereby imposed a tax
on each prohibited transaction. The rate of tax shall be equal to 5 percent
of the amount involved with respect to the prohibited transaction for each
year (or part thereof) in the taxable period. The tax imposed by this subsection shall be paid by any disqualified person who participates in the
prohibited transaction (other than a fiduciary acting only as such).
(b) Additional taxes on disqualifiedperson. - In any case in which an
initial tax is imposed by subsection (a) on a prohibited transaction and the
transaction is not corrected within the taxable period, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 100 percent of the amount involved. The tax imposed
by this subsection shall be paid by any disqualified person who participated
in the prohibited transaction (other than a fiduciary acting only as such).
A 'disqualified person' is defined as:
(2) DisqualifiedPerson. - For purposes of this section, the term 'disqualified person' means a person who is (A) a fiduciary;
(B) a person providing services to the plan;
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by the plan;
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
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Standing alone, section 406 appears to prohibit a trustee from ever

engaging in party-in-interest transactions. However, sections 407 and
408 provide the pension trustee an avenue to acquire or retain a limited

amount of employer securities for the pension plans."8 Unfortunately,
the officer/trustee, with ambitions to control the corporation, often misunderstands these sections to imply a clear exception to the prohibited

transaction provision.

9

(D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by
the plan;
(E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of a corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or the profits interest of a partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or incorporated enterprise,
which is an employer or an employee organization described in subparagraph (C) or (D);
(F) a member of the family (as defined in paragraph (6)) of any
individual described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E);
(G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate or which (or in
which) 50 percent or more of(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation,
(ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or
(iii) the beneficial interest of such trust or estate,
is owned directly or indirectly, or held by persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E);
(H) an officer, director (or an individual having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers or directors), a 10 percent or more shareholder, or a highly compensated employee (earning 10 percent or more of
the yearly wages of an employer) of a person described in subparagraph

(C), (D), (E), or (G); or
(I) a 10 percent or more (in capital or profits) partner or joint venturer of a person described in subparagraph (C), (D), (E), or (G).
The Secretary, after consultation and coordination with the Secretary
of Labor or his delegate, may by regulation prescribe a percentage lower
than 50 percent for subpargraphs (E) and (G) and lower than 10 percent
for subparagraphs (H) and (I).
I.R.C. § 4975 (a),(b), (0(2) (1984).
This author does not intend to provide an exhaustive review of the I.R.C. provisions for prohibited transactions of an ERISA trustee. Accordingly, the tax consequences surrounding an ERISA trustee's conflict of interest abuse are beyond the scope
of this Note.
48. See ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (1982) ERISA §
408(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1108(e)(1) (1982).
49. The court in Donovan v. Bierwith rejected appellant's claim that § 1107 prohttps://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss3/1
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Exceptions to the Prohibited Transactions Rule - Sections
407 and 408

C.

Section 407(a)(2) establishes a loophole to ERISA's prohibited
transaction section. This loophole permits an ERISA plan trustee to
invest in "employer securities up to ten percent of the fair market value
of the assets in the plan." 50 Section 408(e)(1) supplements this proviso
by exempting employer securities, if acquired for adequate consideration, from sections 406 and 407.51 Thus, section 408(e)(1) acts as an
exemption to the 406 prohibited transaction rule. It is not surprising
that this limited exception is an attractive lure to an officer/trustee facing potential conflicts of interest. Along with the latent interpretational
problems presented to the officer/trustee in section 404's prudency
standards, this adequate consideration exception adds to the possibility
that a trustee will act as an officer to acquire corporate securities, while
using the trust corpus to track an imprudent venture in violation of his
fiduciary obligation to plan participants.
IV.
A.

Common Conflict of Interests Facing Officer/Trustees

Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Officer/Trustee's Use of Plan
Funds to Purchase Corporation.

In Eaves v. Penn, 2 an officer/trustee acquired employer stock using a mix of his personal and ERISA plan pension capital. The
purchase enabled him to establish majority shareholder control.13 The
vides an "unlimited" exception to § 1106's prohibited transaction standards. Bierwith,
680 F.2d at 271.
50. ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (1982).
51. ERISA § 408(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e)(1) (1982) provides that:
(e) Sections 1106 and 1107 of this title shall not apply to the acquisition or sale by a plan or qualifying employer securities (as defined in §
1107(d)(5) of this title) or acquisition, sale or lease by a plan of qualifying
employer real property (as defined in § 1107(d)(4) of this title(1) if such acquisition, sale, or lease is for adequate consideration
(or in the case of a marketable obligation, at a price not less favorable to
the plan than the price determined under § 1107(e)(1) of this title), (emphasis added).

Id.
52. 426 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Okla. 1976), modified, (rem. on attorneys' fees issue) 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
53. Eaves, 587 F.2d at 453, 455.
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court examined the propriety of a purchase agreement entered into by
the trustee (Penn) of the employee stock ownership plan, and the current majority shareholders (Eaves). As trustee of the pension plan,
Penn caused the transfer of $1,013,134.01 to the Eaveses for 6,807
shares of stock, 54 to be held by the substituted employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)." Penn used his own capital to purchase the remainder of the majority shares from the Eaveses5 Penn compensated the
Eaveses for their stock holdings, and, through an amendment to the
company's original profit sharing plan that created an employee stock
ownership plan, 57 he transferred company assets into the new ESOP.5 8
This transfer occurred in the form of an advance payment from the
company's assets into the newly formed ESOP.59 By virtue of this elaborate transfer, Penn gained control over a majority amount of company
shares and designated himself a board member, vice-president and
treasurer of the target company, Glenns, Inc.6 0
Before the transfer and purchase, Glenns, Inc. maintained a strong
financial condition relative to its market place."' However, after Penn's
acquisition, leveraged by funds drawn from the ESOP,6 2 the value of
Glenns, Inc. shares experienced a decline by approximately $500,000.13
As a result of Penn's actions stockholder's equity declined from a preacquisition value of $746,711 to a value of $76,000.4 The Tenth Circuit held that the officer/trustee's elaborate buyout scheme, fueled by
the amendment to the company's profit sharing plan, constituted a section 404 breach of his fiduciary duties65 owed to that company's plan
participants and their beneficiaries. 6

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 456.
Id.
Id.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals label Penn's transaction
with the substituted ESOP as a "prohibited transaction." Thus, the outgoing directors
were not treated as parties-in-interest with the substituted ESOP.
66. Id. at 454.
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1. Does ERISA Hold the Officer/Trustee to UnrealisticExpectations, If Not Inequitable Standards?
Penn contended on appeal that, as a trustee, his fiduciary duty
bound him to the terms of the amended profit sharing plan, the ESOP,
and ERISA to "invest the Plan's fund in Employer's securities, unless
compliance was impossible, illegal or directly inconsistent with a specific prohibition of ERISA." 7 The court believed that this attempt to
define Penn's fiduciary role to the plan participants was putting the
cart before the horse. The court stated: "the premise for such a contention is based on the adoption of a uniform exemption for violations of
§1104 fiduciary standards in cases involving the discretionary activities
of an ESOP trustee.

'6 8

Instead, this is really an instance where Penn

interpreted the breadth of the section 408(e) prohibited transaction exception to stand as a vanguard over section 404's fiduciary standard
section. It is established authority that section 408(e)'s limited exception should act as supplementary capacity in deference to section 404's
prudence and diversification requirements.6 9 The court adopted this
viewpoint and stated that, "[w]hile an ESOP trustee may be released
from certain per se violations . . ., the structure of the Act itself requires that an ESOP fiduciary . . . is governed by the 'solely in the
70
interest' and prudence tests of §§ 404(a)(1)(A) and (B)."

Although the Tenth Circuit found that Penn's capital acquisition
strategy violated ERISA's fiduciary standards section, his actions were
not uncommon when weighed against liberal principles of corporate finance.7 1 Arguably, if Penn had transferred capital from the amended
profit sharing plan into the ESOP and successfully gained control of
the company, this lawsuit may not have ensued. Although the courts
67. Id. at 458.
68. Id. at 459. ESOP refers to an employee stock ownership plan. See, I.R.C. §
4975(e)(7) (1984).
69. Eaves, 587 F.2d at 459, (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5038:
Thus, while a plan may be able to acquire employers securities or real
property under the employers security rules, the acquisition must be for
the exclusive benefit of participantsand beneficiaries.Consequently, if the
real property is acquired primarily to finance the employer, this would not
meet the exclusive benefit requirement.
Id. (Emphasis supplied).

70. Id.
71. See generally Brecher, Lazarus III, & Gray, The Function of Employee Retirement Plans as an Impediment to Takeovers, 38 Bus. LAw 503 (1983).
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warn that a fiduciary's practices will be judged prospectively, 72 rather

than retrospectively, it is doubtful that a member of a successfully run
ESO P 7 3 would sue the trustee of the plan and allege that that trustee

gained control of the company in an imprudent fashion. 714 Thus, it is
likely that, had Penn's buyout inurred to the benefit of plan participants in the form of enhanced shareholder equity, Penn would still be

the vice-president, treasurer and board member of Glenn's, Inc. 75
Under slightly different circumstances, it is conceivable that an officer/trustee might sidestep a section 404 challenge to his disputed capital transfer by means of better corporate and managerial skills.
Favorable financial results, measured by an increase in shareholder's
equity, would appease the plan participants. When viewed retrospectively, such a purchase plan might prove "solely to benefit plan partici-

pants" thereby satisfying the section 404 fiduciary standards. 76 Given
this hypothetical result, inequity in prosecutorial standards is likely to
occur.7 As long as corporate officers can act as plan trustees, there will

be circumstances when an officer/trustee may be tempted to manipulate the assets of the employee pension plan to suit his own business
interests. The trustee will do this with the belief that a somewhat im-

prudent strategy might result in enhanced wealth for the company
shareholders (who are also plan members) as well as advanced personal

power, wealth, and prestige for himself.

72.

Withers, 47 F. Supp. at 1255.

73. The growth in an ESOP can be measured by the rate of return its investments experienced during a given time period.
74. But see Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. I1l. 1982), vacated rem, 727
F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1984). In that case, members of a corporate profit sharing plan
brought suit for fiduciary breach by the trustees. The trust investments experienced an
"extraordinary" return, however, the participants' plan payments were deferred by the
trustees.
75. This conclusion is further buttressed by evidence of the District Court's finding of facts. See Eaves, 426 F. Supp. at 830, 832-36.
76. Despite the court's holding in Leigh, 535 F. Supp. at 418, this author argues
that no cause of action would have been filed by the plan participants in the Eaves
action had: (1) Penn successfully managed the Glenns, Inc. and (2) all payments to
retired or withdrawn members were not deferred.
77. Specifically, imprudent uses of ESOP assets resulting in successful ventures
could not be prosecuted, while unsuccessful investments would instigate actions for fiduciary breach.
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An Officer/Trustee's Investment Decisions Track Independent Investment Group's Acquisition Plans.

In Leigh v. Engle,7 8 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that two officer/trustees' actions in three separate investment acquisition plans violated the fiduciary standards section of ERISA.7 9 The disputed transactions involved investment decisions that were made by
trustees of the Reliance Manufacturing Corporation's Employees Profit
Sharing Trust.80 The officer/trustees, who were also members of an acquisition group, directed trust capital to finance the acquisition aspirations of the group. 81 Each investment by the trust precluded an attempt
by the group to purchase large blocks of that company's stock.82 Thus,
despite an extraordinary return on investment, the trustees' use of trust
capital to track the group's acquisition attempts violated their fiduciary
responsibilities pursuant to section 404.83
The investment group consisted of various individuals representing
three different corporations: Libco Corporation, GSC Corporation, and
Reliable Manufacturing.84 The head of the group, a financier, and
CEO of Libco and GSC, did not act alone. He received assistance from
the chief counsel for Libco, who was the administrator of the Reliable
Trust (Employee pension plan), the president of Reliable Manufacturing, who was also co-administrator of the trust, and an investment analyst hired by Libco.85 This group centered its acquisition attempts on
the three companies: Berkeley Bio Medical, Outdoor Sports Industries,
and the Hickory Furniture Company.8
As a white knight,8 7 the financier purchased approximately 60,000
78. Leigh, 535 F. Supp. at 418.
79. Leigh, 727 F.2d at 116.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 117.
82. Id. at 118.
83. Id. at 128.
84. Id. at 116.
85. Id. at 117.
86. Id. at 116.
87. White knight is the colloquialism for a third, independent company that is
solicited by the firm whose stock is being pursued by the acquiring firm. Usually, the
third firm (the white knight) enters into an agreement with the firm that is being pursued. Often the pursued firm negotiates an exchange of its stock for the efforts of the
third party to buy a large number of shares and thereby defeat the acquiring firm's
attempt at gaining control of the pursued company. See American General Ins. Co. v.
Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 732 n.19 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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shares of Berkeley stock prior to the investment group meeting in an
attempt to prevent a hostile tender offer88 by Cooper Industries, the
firm intending to takeover control of Berkely. 89 Following a meeting of
the investment group, the Reliable trust purchased 15,000 shares of
Berkeley stock.90 After the pension plan's purchase, the financier sent
correspondence to other Berkeley block shareholders, in an attempt to
solicit either their interests in the stock or their proxy in upcoming
Berkeley board meetings.9 1 This attempt was the result of opposition to
the ongoing talks between Berkeley and Cooper Industries, the company that had set forth its initial tender offer.92 Eventually, the financier withdrew his complaint, negotiated the tender of its holdings to
Cooper, and realized a "substantial profit for its Berkeley stock
interests."9
The group's investment in the OSI Corporation assumed a pattern
similar to the Berkeley coup.94 Again, the trust administrators tracked
the investment group's acquisition plans by purchasing 12,400 shares of
OSI stock.9 5 Subsequent to this purchase, the investment group, headed
by its financier, battled the present OSI management for managerial
control.96 The tender fight ended when a white knight sided with OSI
management and offered fifteen dollars per share to the investment
group for their OSI stock holdings.9 7 The group responded by selling its
shares to the white knight at a one hundred forty-one percent profit.9 8
The investment group was less successful in their acquisition of Hickory Furniture. Following the investment group's purchase of 51,400

88. See A. Fleischer, Jr., Tender Offers: Defenses, Responses and Planning 99
(1978):
A tender or exchange offer is aimed directly at the shareholders of the
target. The bidder may make an offer irrespective of director opposition if
it complies with all the legal standards., Unlike the situation in a merger
or sale of assets transaction, in which the board of directors must approve
and recommend the transaction, the shareholders can respond directly to
the offer.
89. Id. 727 F.2d at 119.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 121.
92. Id. at 120.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 121.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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shares, the Reliable trustees bought 8,000 shares of Hickory stock. 99
After the trust's purchase, the investment group became members of
the Hickory Board of Directors, and the trust then sold its shares at a
four percent profit. 100
1. Should a Trustee Refuse to Act Upon Inside Information
Made Available to Him Vis-A-Vis His Corporate Position
As An Officer?
The Seventh Circuit in Leigh found that ERISA is not concerned
with the success of a trust's investment.101 This finding is consistent
with the Congressional intent to preserve the trust corpus through common-law trust principles. 10 2 Indeed, the Leigh court found that Reliable
trustees' activities were "self dealing" and lacked prudence as required
by ERISA's fiduciary standards.1 03 Thus, the investment group's successful investments, resulting in an increase in shareholder equity for
plan participants, are suspect to ERISA's prohibited transaction section, as well as to the Act's fiduciary standards. 0 Because the investments were not "made with an 'eye single' to the interests of the Plan
participants, they lacked the necessary objectivity and prudence prescribed by ERISA."10 By labeling the trustees' actions "self-dealing,"
the court chooses to apply a broad interpretation to "section 406's restriction on officer/trustees of either the 'target' or 'raider' (corporation) who have a significant interest of their own in the outcome of the
contests.106
The Leigh court suggested that, the Reliable trustees may have
avoided violating ERISA's fiduciary standards if the trustees had con10 7
sulted with independent counsel, instead of an interested party. Juxtaposed against other case precedent, this suggestion provides little hint
of a touchstone by which the officer/trustee may measure future invest99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 122, n.17, 123. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 5186 (Statement of Sen. Harrison
Williams).
103. Id. at 132.
104. Id. at 132-134.
105. Id. at 129.
106. See generally Id. at 132-36.
107. Id. at 132.
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ment decisions. Additionally, one authority on the law of trusts observed that:
In reaching his conclusion [the trustee] may take into consideration
advice given to him by attorneys, bankers, brokers, and others
whom prudent men in the community regard as qualified to give
advice. He is not justified, however, in relying wholly upon the advice of others, since it is his duty to exercise his own judgment in
the light of the information and advice which he receives.' 08
In Leigh, the investment group relied solely on the advice solicited
from the investment advisor.' 0 9 The court found that this advice came
from an interested party and lacked the prudence required by
ERISA." l0 The Leigh decision revitalizes the catch-22 atmosphere surrounding the officer/trustee. Specifically, that atmosphere consists of
an improper mix of goal oriented expectations; in one corner stands the
profit maximizing employee, while on the other side is the prudent
trustee.
The Leigh court adopts the Department of Labor suggestion that
trustees in this situation should abdicate their roles as trustees and
"turn over the administration of the plan to another who can set forth a
prudent investment course independent of that trustee's other interests.""' The Department of Labor's suggestion is theoretically sound,
but based on the premise that an officer/trustee will always recognize a
situation that constitutes ERISA's fiduciary self-dealing. 112 When it is
proven that the officer/trustee will ignore standards and use pension
funds to self-deal, it follows that logic will not dictate that the same
officer/trustee resign his position"' for the sake of prudence." 4 In Don-

108. A. SCOTT, supra note 33.
109. Leigh, 727 F.2d at 132-35.
110. Id. at 132.
111. Id.
112. Semantic problems arise when the courts struggle to consider whether an
action is "self-dealing." Is this an unfair label to affix upon the officer/trustee acting
upon confidential information? Had Goldman, Sachs & Company circulated a "buy"
opinion sheet to its investing customers suggesting that Berkeley appeared to be an
attractive purchase, would the Reliable trustee's purchase be prudent? Here, ERISA
and the courts shed little light on the way in which an officer/trustee may ever insulate
himself from charges of fiduciary breach, while making an attractive investment for the
trust plan.
113. See Leigh, 727 F.2d at 132.
114. Congress assesses penalties against breaching fiduciaries by: (1) awarding
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ovan v. Cunningham,1 5 the court adopts section 408(e)'s adequate con-

sideration requirement116 as the test for an officer/trustee's prudence
over his investment decisions. The Cunningham court held that "ESOP
fiduciaries will carry their burden to prove . . [the payment of] . . .
adequate consideration . . .[established by] . . .prudent investigation
in the prevailing circumstances" 11 7 However, this interpretation unearths little knowledge, because the standard of prudence expected of

the officer/trustee is left as an undefined principle. It follows that the
adoption of an adequate consideration standard fails to extricate the
officer/trustee from the catch-22 situation encountered by the trustees
in the Leigh case.

C.

Fiduciary Breach By an Officer/Trustee in the Midst of a
Corporate Tender Offer.

ERISA's fiduciary standards section plays an important role in
judging the actions of an officer/trustee's investment decision to tender,
or refuse to tender, corporate securities held by the employee stock

ownership plan. In Donovan v. Bierwirth, 18 the court evaluated the
prudence of the trustee who refused to tender corporate securities and

instead, decided to buy company securities in an attempt to ward off
the bid of an acquiring firm. 19
Board members of the Grumman Corporation voted to prevent a

tender offer by the LTV Corp. 120 Following this board meeting, all
ESOP participants received a memorandum informing them that their
compensatory damages pursuant to ERISA § 1109, infra note 158; and (2) assessing
tax penalties against "disqualified" persons, I.R.C. § 4975, supra n. 45. As these provisions failed to deter the trustees in Eaves and Leigh from breaching their fiduciary
duty to plan participants, it would seem that these provisions are not realistic. Further,
these penalties may fail to compensate plan participants in the event that the breaching
fiduciary is insolvent. See, infra notes 160-2 and accompanying text.
115. Donovan v. Cunningham, 541 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd in part,
U.S.-_
vacated in part, rev. in part, 716 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. den., 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984).
116. Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1465.
117. Id. at 1467-68.
118. Donovan v. Bierwith, 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), 680 F.2d 263 (2d.
Cir. 1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
119. Id. at 466. "In this lawsuit, the ESOP officer/trustee's decision to retain
Grumman stock while purchasing additional stock on the open market, did not constitute a prohibited transaction."
120. Id.
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plan held one third of Grumman outstanding stock. The memorandum
provided that "these plans are managed by Grummanites who will look
long and hard at how well their fellow members would be served by
selling off Grumman stock. '121 One month later, Grumman trustees
decided to refuse the tender offer for any of the shares held by the
pension plan. 1 22 Instead, the trustees voted to purchase an additional
1,275,000 shares of Grumman stock in an attempt to maintain control
and defeat LTV's acquisiton attempt. 2 3 The trustees based this
purchase decision on an investment outlook report by Dillon, Read &
Company, an investment banking concern retained by Grumman. 2 4
The District Court viewed the recommendation of Dillon, Read &
Company as constituting "no real inquiry into the dangers presented to
the Pension plan in the event of a takeover,. . . [instead]. . . the trustee's imprudence formed a policy of 'conscious avoidance' to any positive effects that the LTV tender offer could enhance shareholder
wealth."'1 25 The court ruled that "the trustees were not justified in relying upon the advice of Dillon, Read & Co. since that company had
provided investment banking services to Grumman in the past, including acting as a manager of an offering of its convertible subordinated
debentures in April, 1980. '' 126 In support of its finding that Dillon,
Read & Company had an "obvious interest in Grumman's continuing
independence,"' 2 7 the court stated that:
In relying upon the advice of another, he [the trustee] should consider whether the person giving the advice is disinterested. Thus, it
has been held that in purchasing securities for the trust he is not
justified in relying solely on the advice of a broker interested in the
128
sale of the securities."'
Accordingly, the Grumman trustees' decision to retain company securities and purchase additional stock, combined with their failure to seek
impartial investment advice and constituted a breach of section 404.129

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 472.
Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
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On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Grumman
trustees argued that their actions did not arise under §1106's prohibited transactions self-dealing provision. 130 In support of this argument,
the trustees quoted a 1973 statement by the Department of Labor
before the Senate Finance Committee.131 In pertinent part, this statement provided that:
Since such an employer will often be an administrator of his plan,
or will function as a trustee or in some other fiduciary capacity,
this provision [§1107(a)(3)] creates a limited exception to the
listed proscription against self-dealing. The exception is made in
recognition of the symbiotic relationship existing
between the em132

ployer and the plan covering his employees.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the Grumman trustees did
not violate the prohibited transaction section of ERISA by following a
course of action which "benefits the corporation as well as the beneficiaries. 1 33 However, the Second Circuit did find that the trustees' actions were not made at all times with "an eye single to the interests of
the plan participants and their beneficiaries," which constituted a
breach of §1404's fiduciary standards. 34
In retrospect, the Grumman officer/trustees' predicament is understandable in light of practical business considerations minimized by the
Second Circuit. Realistically, Bierwirth and the other trustees acted in
their official capacity as corporate officers when they decided to defeat
the LTV tender offer. According to testimony in the district court, this
decision is consistent with management's stated belief that LTV, pursuant to a successful tender offer, would replace existing Grumman management with LTV designees.13 5 Under this assumption, Grumman
trustees believed that any new management implemented by LTV
would create a negative impact on shareholder equity, thereby posing a
threat to the Employee Benefit Plan holdings.138 The Second Circuit
130. Bierwith, 680 F.2d at 271.
131. See id. at 271 (quoting Private Pension Reform: Hearings Before the Subcom. on Private Pension Plans of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93 Cong., 1st Sess.
446 (1973) (statement of Department of Labor).
132. Donovan v. Bierwith, 680 F.2d at 271.
133. Id. at 271-72.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 275.
136. Even though LTV did not announce that Grumman's executives would be
displaced upon the success of its tender offer, a majority of hostile takeovers end with
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empathized with this concern in light of a debt ridden LTV. 137 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit focused its attention on the Grumman trustees' decision to purchase additional Grumman stock and cautioned that
they:
should have realized that their judgment ... would be biased and
accordingly they should take. . . every feasible precaution to free
themselves. . . from any taint of the quick negative reaction characteristic of targets of hostile tender offers . . .(and) consider the
huge risks attendant with purchasing additional Grumman shares
at a price substantially elevated by the tender offer. 138
In other words, the Grumman trustees should have insulated themselves from any reaction that might be aligned with the normal reaction of a corporate decision maker.
1.

Bendix-Martin Marietta: A Solution to the Dual Loyalty
Problem?

Another conflict arose when Bendix made a hostile tender offer to
acquire outstanding stock in the Martin Marietta corporation. 139
Thereafter, Martin Marietta counter-offered for Bendix' outstanding
stock.140 During this tender battle, Bendix plan trustees held eleven
percent of outstanding Bendix stock, in the Bendix Salaried Employees
Savings and Stock Ownership Plan (BSESSOP). The plan trustees sold
four million five hundred thousand shares to Martin Marietta, at
tender price, thereby "carry[ing] out its fiduciary responsibility by preserving 'all options' for the plan and its participants.11 4 1 Citibank of
New York acted as the independent manager to Bendix' employee

the acquiring company substituting its chosen officials in place of the acquired company's executives. Note, The Duties of Employee Benefit Plan Trustee under ERISA
in Hostile Tender Offers, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1692, 1703 (1982).

137. Bierwith, 680 F.2d at 276.
138. Id.
139. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. The Bendix Corp., No. 82-7669 (2d Cir.,
September 21, 1982)). Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 1982, at 4, col.l; Sept. 17, 1982,
at 2, col.2; Sept. 20, 1982, at 2, col.2; Sept. 21, 1982, at 2, col.2.
140. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1982 at 2, col.2. See also Martin Marietta
Corp. v. The Bendix Corp., supra note 139.
141. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1982, at 2, col.2. See also New York Times,
Sept. 24, 1982, at Dl, col.5.
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stock ownership plan. 42 To challenge the independent trustee's decision
to tender, Bendix filed for a temporary restraining order in federal district court.1 43 The district court did not issue the temporary restraining
order against the Citibank asset plan manager. To the contrary, the
district court judge ordered the plan manager to carry out his original
decision to tender Bendix stock to Martin Marietta. 1 " On a motion for
rehearing and modification, Bendix argued that ninety-four percent of
the shareholders instructed the Citibank manager to withdraw the
tender.1 45 The court, however, refused to modify its original order.1 46
One could argue that a tender offer made solely in the interest of
the plan participants would never have occured had a Bendix officer/
trustee managed the Plan. Instead, an independent qualified asset
plan manager accepted the tender, satisfying his fiduciary responsibility
to the members of the plan without any outside conflict of loyalties
impacting upon that decision. This is the ultimate goal of the fiduciary
policy guidelines set forth in ERISA.
V.

Judicial Standard of Review that Gauges a Trustee's
Prudence in Administering Plan Assets

Federal courts have firmly established that the actions of a trustee
over the management of an ERISA Plan are to be analyzed on the
basis of "whether those actions were arbitrary and capricious in light of
the trustees' responsibility to all potential beneficiaries. 1 48 In Fine v.
Semet, 49 for example, a district court held that the actions of the
142. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1982, at 2, col.2.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Accordingly, the court in Leigh observed that:
Otherwise, the risk is too great that the trustee will come to a crossroads .
where the interests of the plan and the party-in-interest diverge. For example, while the party-in-interest may be seeking to accumulate as many
shares as possible in order to maintain or acquire control, a plan's interest in maximizing its investment return may require it to tender its shares
to a competing bidderfor shares.
Leigh, 727 F.2d at 132 (emphasis added).
148. Rueda v. Seafarers Union, 576 F.2d 939, 942 (1st Cir. 1978).
149. Fine v. Semet, 514 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 1091 (11th
Cir. 1983).
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trustees are consistent with their fiduciary duties under ERISA. 150 In
support of this finding, the court noted that the partner/trustee's concern about the impact of an immediate lump-sum payment to a depart-

ing law firm partner was well founded and rested on the consideration
"that a sudden loss of some fourteen percent of the Plan's assets, combined with the significant potential for additional requests for immediate payments could not be acts of an arbitrary or capricious nature.'151

150. Id. at 42-43. The District Court considered the decision of the profit sharing
trustee not to allow a departing partner to withdraw his lump-sum benefit from plan
assets. The plan documents provided that:
Upon termination of a Participant's employment prior to attaining Normal
Retirement Age (for any reason other than death or disability), a Participant may elect, upon the consent of the Advisory Committee, to direct the
Trustee to commence payment to the Participant of his Nonforfeitable Accrued Benefit prior to the Participant's attaining Normal Retirement Age.
The Advisory Committee must give its direction to the Trustee on or
before the last day of the Plan Year in which the Participant first incurs a
Break in Service as a result of the termination of his employment. . . .If
the terminating Participant is one hundred percent (100%) vested in his
Accrued Benefit by the close of the Plan Year in which his employment
terminates, the Advisory Committee, in its sole discretion, may direct the
Trustee to commence payment to the Participant of his Accrued Benefit
within sixty (60) days after the close of the Plan Year in which the Participant's employment terminates without regard to the Participant's incurring a Break in Service. ...
If the Advisory Committee does not give the Trustee a direction to commence payment, the Trustee shall continue to hold the Participant's Accrued Benefit in trust until the close of the Plan Year in which the Participant attains Normal Retirement Age. At that time, the Trustee shall
commence payment of the Participant's Nonforfeitable Accrued Benefit in
accord with the provisions of Article VI. ...
If the Participant terminates employment prior to attaining Normal Retirement Age because of death or disability, the Advisory Committee shall
direct the Trustee to commence payment of the Participant's Accrued
Benefit to him (or to his Beneficiary if the Particiant is deceased), in accord with the provisions of Section 6.02, within sixty (60) days after the
close of the Plan Year in which the Participant's employment terminates.
[Deleted portions relate to date payment is to be made if directed by Advisory Committee, calculation of benefits at the close of a plan year, and
alternative provisions for payment of benefits in case of death or
disability].
Fine v. Semet, 514 F. Supp. at 37-38 (emphasis supplied). After it conducted a fair
reading of the plan documents, the court determined that the trustee's actions were not
"arbitrary or capricious."
151. Id.
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The fourteen percent reduction that would result from the partner's
withdrawal augmented the trustee's concern over assessing future investment goals and over potential financial loss to remaining plan participants.15 2 Thus, the retention of the departing employee's funds created a very realistic concern to the maintenance of the trust corpus.
The court reasoned that an act can be "arbitrary and capricious"
if "invalid preferences" are proven to exist. 153 Such preferences are established "not merely on a showing of dissimilar treatment, but on dis1
similar treatment based on 'improper purpose' or irrational effect." 5'
Because the trustees' acts had a valid purpose, grounded in the rational
plan members, they did not act in an
effect that benefitted remaining
1 55
arbitrary or capricious nature.
The Fine court's application of an arbitrary or capricious test in
connection with "invalid preferences" or "irrational effects" should
provide the judiciary with an uniform test to interpret the actions of an
officer/trustee. Although the ERISA fiduciary responsibility section
does not expressly mention the arbitrary or capricious standard, the
federal judiciary should adopt this standard in conflict of interest cases.
Such a uniform standard is clearly lacking in cases like Donovan v.
Bierwirth,5M Eaves v. Penn,1 57 and Leigh v. Engle.1 5 The arbitrary or
capricious standard, however, is only a post facto solution because it
fails to curb an officer/trustee's fiduciary breach at its genesis - conflict of interest. Therefore, Congress must adopt a uniform policy that
will rid ERISA pension plans of the conflicts that inevitably result
when a trustee acts in dual capacities for the plan and in the management of the corporation. This proposed Congressional policy will save
company plan assets from the dissipation that results due to an officer/
trustee's dual loyalties that eventually lead to fiduciary breach.
VI.

ERISA's Provision for Relief from Fiduciary Breach Fails
to Protect Plan Participants From Loss
If an officer/trustee's actions are clearly in violation of ERISA's

152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at 44.
Id.

155.

Id.

156.
157.

See Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. at 463.
See Eaves, 426 F. Supp. at 830.

158. See Leigh, 535 F. Supp. at 418.
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fiduciary standards, it is likely that adequate redress will not be available to plan participants and their beneficiaries. Section 409(a) of
ERISA provides in pertinent part that: "Any person who is a fiduciary

with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
159
each such breach".
In Freund v. Marshall & llsley Bank,160 pension trustees breached
their fiduciary duties, and the court ordered that they be jointly and
severally liable to restore to the plan $464,925.95, the amount ad-

judged to constitute damages of their breach.""' Plan participants' beneficiaries might survive dissipation if the trustees can satisfy the court's
judgment. On the average, officer/trustees who are guilty of a breach
involving millions of lost plan dollars surely cannot restore such
amounts to the plan. The corporation need not indemnify "bad faith"
fiduciaries in such cases.'6 2 Thus plan participants are exposed to catos159. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (1982).
160. Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 636.
161. Id. at 633-35.
162. However, some state corporation acts provide for the indemnification of officers, directors, employees, and agents. Fla. Stat. § 607.014(1)(1984), provides:
607.014 Indemnification. of officers, directors, employees, and
agents. (1) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who
was or is a party, or is threatened to be made a party, to any threatened,
pending, or completed action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil, criminal,
administrative, or investigative (other than an action by, or in the right of,
the corporation), by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer,
employee, or agent of the corporation or is or was serving at the request of
the corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise against expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fined, and amounts paid in
settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with
such action, suit, or proceeding, including any appeal thereof, if he acted
in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in, or not
opposed to, the best interests of the corporationand, with respect to any
criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination of any action, suit, or proceeding by
judgment, order, settlement, or conviction or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the
person did not act in good faith and in a manner which he reasonably
believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation or,
with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to
believe that his conduct was unlawful.
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trophic losses if the officer/trustee cannot satisfy a court order that he
compensate the plan for his fiduciary breach.
VII.

Conclusion

In a statement before the Subcommittee on Labor, United States
Representative John Erlenborn of Illinois referred to ERISA as "the
subject of derision, inasmuch as the acronym has come to stand for
'Every Ridiculous Idea Since Adam.' 1613 It is apparent that Section
408(c)(3)'s provision that allows an officer of a corporation to act as a
trustee over that company's pension plan adds impetus to Representative Erlenborn's statement."" As the cases reviewed in this note demonstrate, it is often impractical to allow an officer with loyalties divided
between the goals of his corporation and the interests of the plan participants open access to a highly liquid source of capital. Specifically,
section 404 requires that an officer/trustee set aside his daily corporate
obligations (that often include his own job security)1 65 and abide by
common-law trust prudency standards. 66
Additionally, the trustee cannot gauge his investment decisions
with only one uniform standard of conduct. As the "adequate consideration" standard is based upon prudence,167 it fails to provide one consistent regulatory standard to measure the trustee's investment decisions. Confronted with case precedent and the Department of Labor's
diversification standards, the officer/trustee is left with a mass of conflicting standards.
The Department of Labor proposes that a officer/trustee resign his
administration upon discovery of possible "self-dealing" circum-

Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, in Florida, if the officer/trustee acts in "good faith" by administering the plan in
the "best interests" of the corporation, he may be indemnified for the resultant loss to
plan participants. However, the Florida Act has no provision for the corporate indemni-

fication of officer/trustee's "bad faith" breach.
163. Retirement Income Incentives Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1541 Before the
Senate Sub. Comm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Human Resources, 97 Cong., 1
Sess. 846-54 (1982)(statement by U.S. Representative John Erlenborn).
164. Section 1108(c)(3) adds impetus to Representative Erelenborn's statement,
as it allows an officer/trustee access to a position where he will surely encounter conflicts of interest that could threaten plan asset security.
165. See supra note 136.
166. See ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
167. Compare § 1104 with § 1108(e).
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stances. 168 Though this suggestion might avoid fiduciary breach, it is
based on the unrealistic supposition that a officer/trustee can recognize
situations constituting conflicts of interest. While the judiciary can

adopt a uniform "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review to determine whether an officer/trustee actually breached his fiduciary duties,
it is a post facto solution.
The best solution available to Congress is to repeal section
408(c)(3) and disallow an officer of the corporation from acting in a

dual capacity as an ERISA trustee. In its place, Congress should enact
a substitute section that provides for a two-tiered investment counselling requirement. All ERISA plans with assets over $2,550,000 must
employ the services of an ERISA investment manager,16 9 while those
plans with assets below this mark need not abide by this requirement.
1 70 such a plan manager will be able
As in Bendix v. Martin Marietta,
to administer plan assets independent of ongoing corporate activity,

thereby eliminating the difficulties inherent in allowing an officer access
over the administration of an ERISA pension plan. Nevertheless an

168. See Leigh, 727 F.2d at 132.
169. This $2,550,000 allowance is determined by: $17,000 [I.R.S. Employer/
Employee Joint Contribution Allowance to Individual Retirement Account] x 150 employees (average number of employees based upon U.S. Census Report on Employer
Benefits in Medium and Large Firms). See I.R.C. §§ 219(a), (b)(1) and (b)(2);
1371(a)(3) (1985). STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 437, (104th ed.
1984). ERISA defines an investment manager as:
any fiduciary (other than a trustee or named fiduciary, as defined in §
1102(a)(2) of this title) (A) who has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of any asset
of a plan;
(B) who is (i) registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; (ii) is a bank, as defined in that Act; or (iii) is
an insurance company qualified to perform services described in subparagraph (A) under the laws of more than one State; and)
(C) has acknowledged in writing that he is a fiduciary with respect
to the plan.
ERISA § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (1982). See also Shilling, The CFO's Potential
Fiduciary Liability under ERISA, CFO., March 1985, at 65-6. A CFO (Chief Financial Officer) who names an ERISA investment manager to administer plan assets may
be liable to plan participants or their beneficiaries for fiduciary breach if: "(1) the CFO
participates :n or conceals a breach of fiduciary duty; (2) the CFO knows of a breach
but does nothing to remedy it; or (3) the CFO's failure to carry out his other duties
[i.e. failure to choose the investment manager prudently] made the breach possible."
Id.
170. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1982, at 2, col.2.
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officer may act as a trustee to plans with assets under $2,550,000. This
allowance is contingent on the stringent requirement that the officer/
trustee, upon discovery of a "questionable transaction," 171 seek the advice of an ERISA investment manager. The incentive for this response
is a clear exemption from any resultant fiduciary breach or imprudent
action that might arise out of the "questionable transaction."
David L Weiss

171. In light of the potential for conflict of interest, this author would define a
"questionable transaction" as one that is clearly violative of accepted corporate investment practice; according to Markowitz's portfolio theory, such an investment clearly
upsets the balance of risk already maintained in the plan's portfolio. See generally
Markowitz, supra note 7, at 77-91.

Published by NSUWorks, 1985

67

Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1

Corporate Golden Parachutes: An Executive Bailout
from Fiduciary Duty?

I.

Introduction to Golden Parachutes

A golden parachute is a potentially lucrative wage contract that
compensates officers or other key executives of a corporation in the
event of a change in control.' They are rapidly becoming a corporation's newest defensive weapon in a takeover battle. For example, if a
takeover should occur which results in the replacement of existing management, the golden parachute would assure an ousted officer that he
would be compensated. The ousted officer's compensation may be as
high as several million dollars. Thus, an executive receives a golden
profit when he "bails out" from his position.
Golden parachutes come in many forms, such as specific job titles,
bonuses, or pension plans, but most often are simply a lump sum of
money.2 Although contractural perks for top management are not new,
there is a sharp distinction between golden parachutes and other attractive executive compensation plans. Golden parachutes are triggered
when there is a change in control of the corporation. If control never
changes, then the executive never receives the parachute compensation.
Thus, although justified as just another type of executive compensation,
the frequent implementation of golden parachutes by corporations following a wave of merger and takeover activities in the late 1970's and
early 1980's clearly underlies one main objective - to fend off
takeovers. 4
Arguably, golden parachutes are accomplishing that objective. In
1983, for example, tender offers fell to a six year low in terms of frequency and value.5 While some analysts partially credit a strong stock
market for this decline, other analysts credit the increased use of effec1. Note, Golden Parachutes- Executive Compensation or Executive Overreaching?, 9 J. CORP. LAW 346 (1984).
2. McLaughlin, On Golden Parachutes, 17 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Summer
1982, at 23.
3. Id. at 22.
4. Id.
5. Austin & Jackson, Tender Offer Update: 1984, 19 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,

Spring 1984, at 63.
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tive defensive tactics by target companies as a major factor.6 Therefore,
it appears as though golden parachutes have had a solid impact in discouraging takeover attempts. With approximately sixty percent of the
top one thousand American corporations now using golden parachutes,
a strong case can be made that no executive should be without one.
Corporate directors continue to justify golden parachutes mainly
on the presumption that they attract and keep top-quality management." Other directors question this reasoning, claiming that an executive's primary motivation during a tender offer period should derive
from fighting to save their own company. Officers want to remain in
command and not become part of another company. 9 This is the attitude that was taken by William Agee, who was the past President of
Bendix Corporation. Mr. Agee claimed his golden parachute did not
alter his strategy in his takeover battle with Martin Marietta Corporation and Allied. 10 Therefore, the existence of a golden parachute may
often attract an "extremely compensation oriented director-officer who
can adopt a laissez-faire attitude during a takeover.""1 The premise of
attracting top-quality management may be just an illusion and the
prevalence of golden parachutes may be the result of corporate "follow
the leader games".12
Whatever the justification may be for a golden parachute, arguably those who are most adversely affected by them are corporate shareholders. A director-officer owes a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of shareholders, especially during a tender offer period.1 3 A golden
parachute may lead a director-officer to become more concerned with
his bail out bonus than in representing the best interests of the shareholders. Even with this obvious potential conflict courts and legislatures
are reluctant to take any concrete measures to restrict their use. Only
the Internal Revenue Service has taken a major active step to limit the

6. Id.
7. See, e.g., FORBES, Nov. 22 1982, at 238. However, other surveys have been
more conservative, estimating 15-30 percent of major corporations. See generally Morrison, Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1982 at 82.
8. Morrison, supra note 7, at 83.
9. Id. at 84.
10. Id.
11. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 24.
12. Id. at 23.
13. H. HENN & J.ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 207 (1983).
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use of golden parachutes. 14 Yet the question remains whether the IRS
is the proper agency and is using the proper methods to resolve the
issue of golden parachutes.
This note will explore the reasons that the mere existence of a
golden parachute can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.
Special emphasis will be given to examining golden parachutes which
are created during a tender offer period. Also, the remedies that a
shareholder may have in the form of a derivative lawsuit under state
law or an action under the Williams Act 15 under federal law will be set
forth. Finally, the 1984 Tax Reform Act' 6 will be examined to show its
restrictive effect on golden parachutes.
II.

The Golden Parachute and the Tender Offer: a Breach of
Fiduciary Duty

Corporations have the power to create golden parachutes by virtue
of The Model Business Corporation Act.. 7 Adopted in full by twentyfive states and in part by virtually every state, the Model Business Corporation Act provides that the power to pay pension, stock option plans,
and any other incentive plans for directors, officers and employees are
among the express general powers of a corporation.' 8 Furthermore, the
courts have reinforced this power by continually recognizing the importance of incentive plans to the success of a corporation, and courts will
only interfere if an incentive plan is deemed to constitute a waste of
corporate assets.' 9 To constitute waste, however, there must be a clear
misuse of the corporation's assets. This misuse must amount to a gift to
a director with no relation to business activities. 20 Without such a flagrant abuse of a corporation's funds, courts are reluctant to become
involved.
Most courts will simply apply the business judgment rule, a court
14.
15.

See infra text accompanying notes 86-93.
Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended

at 15 U.S.C. § 78 n(e)).
16.

I.R.C. § 280 (G) (1984) amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.

90-369, § 46, 98 Stat. 588 (1984).
17. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT.

ANN. 2D

§4(k) (1971).

18. Id. "Besides express powers pursuant to statute or the articles of incorporation, corporations enjoy various implied powers." See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 13, § 183 (1983).
19. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).
20. Id. at 591.
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created concept which states that absent a showing of bad faith, the
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board of direc-

tors.2 Thus, the business judgment rule allows a corporation much
flexibility in managing its activities. The rule probably includes compensation arrangements such as golden parachutes. A board of directors is able to defend its activities on the basis of the business judgment
rule and are often successful because courts do not want to be put in
the position of "second-guessing management."2 2 Furthermore, the

courts have expanded their use of the business judgment rule by now
allowing a board of directors to use the rule not only as an affirmative
defense but also as a preemptive weapon for the dismissal of a shareholder's derivative suit.23 When a corporation can show that a deriva-

tive suit is not in the best interest of the corporation the board of directors may be allowed to terminate the shareholder's action.2 4 Although

the preemptive use of the business judgment rule has yet to be implemented in relation to golden parachutes its application seems likely.

The Model Business Corporation Act and the business judgment rule
allow a corporation much freedom in the use of golden parachutes.
On the other hand, in the area of tender offers, golden parachutes
become more than just a form of compensation in line with pension and
retirement plans. Golden parachutes become an effective bargaining
tool between the target company and the bidder. A conventional tender

offer "normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy
shares of a company usually at a price above the current market
price."2 5 When the tender offeror has acquired a controlling amount of

21.

See Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). See also

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 357(1) (Supp. 1977) .
22. F. BALDWIN, CONFLICTING INTERESTS 25 (1984). However, the business
judgment rule has come under recent criticism with some courts now substituting their

judgment for that of a corporation's board of directors. This result has occurred where
there has been obvious board bias or where the board or shareholders have not been
fully informed. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91, 921 at 90,552 (Del. Jan. 29, 1985).
23. Dent, The Powers of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The
Death of the Derivative Suit? 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96, 98 n.14 (1980).
24. However, certain restrictions do apply. A board of directors must show good
faith and no bias. Therefore, if the board is named as defendant in a shareholder's
derivative suit, they lose their independence. Corporations have gotten around this provision by setting up special litigation committees who make an investigative report and
recommend whether the suit should continue. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811.
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shares, a takeover occurs.2 6 However, in order to accumulate the requisite number of shares, the bidder and the target corporation may negotiate for the tender price of shares of stockholders. Since the bidder's
price for the shares of the corporation is usually well above current
market price, most shareholders will welcome the offer.2" However,
even though a director-officer must always act in the best interests of
the shareholders, he may attempt to fight this profitable takeover in
order to save his job.28 Within one year of most takeovers the previous
management is usually replaced.29 It is during this tender offer period
that a director-officer's loyalty may be questioned due to an inherent
conflict of interest. 30 A breach of fiduciary duty is possible without a
golden parachute because a director-officer is put in the position of
choosing between his job or securing a profitable deal for his shareholders. However, the existence of a golden parachute is a strong outside
factor which further weakens the relationship between a shareholder
and a director-officer.
Golden parachutes can lead to breach of fiduciary duty in two
main ways. First, one who is in a fiduciary position, such as an officer
or key executive, "cannot serve himself first and [shareholders] second." 31 His loyalty must be undivided and influenced only by corporate
considerations. 3 However, since an officer will be guaranteed a large
sum of money if a takeover occurs, his incentive and motivation to inform and protect shareholders is likely to diminish. Although it is argued conversely that a corporate officer may work harder for shareholders by having the security of a golden parachute, it is questionable
whether this type of person should have been hired initially because a
"corporation under siege should not be manned by the unsure or insecure."33 If an officer needs the assurance of a golden parachute in order
to fight a takeover perhaps he does not have the self confidence that is
necessary to do an effective job. Therefore, golden parachutes insure

26. A tender offer is by no means the only way to acquire a corporation. Other
methods which will not be discussed involve exchange of assets, mergers, and proxy
fights. See F. BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 168.
27. Id. at 167.
28. Id.
29. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 27.
30. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del. 1981).
31. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939).
32. Id.
33. Note, Future Executive Bail Outs: Will Golden ParachutesFill the American Business Skies?, 14 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 615, 621 (1983).
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security but increase self-motivation, not fiduciary motivation.
Furthermore, golden parachutes are a drain on a corporation's assets in purely economic terms. An acquiring corporation may reduce its
tender offer price per share to account for the price of the golden parachute. 34 Ohio's Senator Howard Metzenbaum believes this is the primary reason for limitations on the use of golden parachutes. He stated
that acquiring corporations "are not that stupid to not allow the price
of a golden parachute to have an impact on their offering
price. . . [and]. . .shareholders wind up paying for no logical reason." 35 However, there are those who contend that the price of a golden
parachute in relation to the total acquisition price is too minimal to be
a decisive factor in discouraging takeovers.3 6 Gulf Resources Corporation, for example, has golden parachutes totalling thirteen million dollars, an amount which would undoubtedly cause substantial impact on
a bidder.3 7 It is difficult to see how golden parachutes such as these can
promote the best interests of a shareholder. A shareholder's major objective is profit. Arguably, the existence of a golden parachute clearly
conflicts with this objective when corporate funds are used to pay executives rather than channeled to the shareholders through profits.
III.
A.

Shareholder's Remedies for Golden Parachutes

Derivative Actions Under State Law

One line of defense a shareholder may have against golden
parachutes is a derivative suit. A shareholder has a right to bring an
action on behalf of his corporation for the purpose of remedying wrongs
to the corporation in the form of a derivative lawsuit. 8 A prerequisite
34. Note, Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses, 28 VILL. L. REv. 51 (1982). For
example: "[If Company X was willing to offer $20 per share for Company Y's shares,
it might offer $18 instead which would take into account the $2 per share cost of the
severance benefits." Id. at 70.
35. 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1956 (1983).

36. See Morrison, supra note 7, at 86.
37. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 23. Furthermore, this corporation showed a
loss of $77.9 million in comparison to a net profit of $12.7 million in 1981. Id.
38. See H. HENN & J.ALEXANDER, supra note 13 at 1035 which provides:
Equity developed the derivative action so that the shareholder derivatively
or secondarily could enforce a corporate right against insiders or directors
where those in control of the corporation refused to have the corporation
sue directly and thereby protect the whole community of corporate interests-creditors and shareholders, including [his] own investment in the cor-
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under most state statutes is that the complainant must have been a
shareholder of the corporation at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.39
However, the courts have imposed further restrictions on derivative
suits by consistently holding that for derivative suit purposes the complainant must have been a shareholder not only at the time of the
transaction in question, but also must remain a shareholder throughout
the litigation.40 In the absence of such status the complainant no longer
has standing to proceed with the suit. 41 This standing problem has become the shareholder's nemisis in golden parachute litigation. In the
foremost case on golden parachutes to date, Lewis v. Anderson,42 the
Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous rulings that a plaintiff
who ceases to become a shareholder by reason of a merger loses standing to continue a derivative suit.
In Lewis, the plaintiff sued on behalf of the shareholders of Conoco, which had been the target of a successful takeover by Dupont.43
The shareholders alleged that the directors, in anticipation of a potential takeover, entered into nine golden parachute contracts with key officers valued at five million dollars each, effective when the takeover
occurred." The shareholders contended that these golden parachutes
were "illegal, improper. . .and a waste of corporate assets. ' 45 However, because the shareholders had sold their Conoco stock during the
takeover, the defendant corporation moved to dismiss the suit for lack
of standing. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
granting of the motion and did not address the legality of golden
parachutes. 6

poration. The derivative action, because of its procedural development, is
equitable in nature and besides often involves equitable issues of breach of
fiduciary duty but can involve law issues of due care and claims for
damages.
Id.
39. Id. at 1058.
40. See Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d 760, 765-66 (Del. Ch. 1964); Heit v.
Tenneco, Inc., 319 F.Supp. 884, 886 (D. Del. 1970).
41. Braasch, 199 A.2d at 767 holding that "by virtue of the merger... the derivative rights [of a shareholder] have passed to the surviving corporation" Id.
42. 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984).
43. Id. at 1042.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. However, the court emphasized that if there was indeed a wrong committed,
New Conoco (Dupont, Inc.) could bring an action against the management of Old
Conoco on behalf of the shareholders of Old Conoco. But considering that New Conoco
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The effect of such a dismissal for lack of standing appears to leave
no apparent remedy to the shareholder in the form of a derivative lawsuit under state law. Two cases have made exceptions to the standing

prerequisite of continued shareholder status throughout the litigation.
One case found that an exception exists when a corporation becomes a
subsidary of another corporation. 47 The second case created an exception when a corporation is forced to reorganize pursuant to government
antitrust laws. 48 No further exceptions for golden parachutes appear
imminent. Despite this pessimistic forecast, distraught shareholders
have continued to question the legality of golden parachutes in corpo-

rate activities by suing the corporation under a breach of fiduciary duty
claim. 49 In light of these shareholders' absence of success, a better approach may be to attack golden parachutes as a violation of a federal
securities law.

B.

Actions Under Federal Law for Violations of Section 14(e)
of the Williams Act

A shareholder may have a cause of action for violation of a federal
securities law under section 14(e) of the Williams Act.50 The Williams
Act is an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and

the Act's purpose is to require full and fair disclosure to a shareholder

in relation to a tender offer. 51 To accomplish this purpose, the Act pro-

hibits fradulent activities in connection with a tender offer. Only the
Securities and Exchange Commission has been granted express authority by Congress to act under section 14(e) .52 However, the Securities
and Exchange Commission has sought action only under section 14(e)
joined Old Conoco in the motion to dismiss, this is an unlikely solution for the shareholders. Id. at 1050.
47. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 22 (Del. Ch. 1982). The merger in question was a mere corporation facelift and the stockholder retained his ownership interest
in the corporation.
48. Helfand v. Gambee, 136 A.2d 558 (Del. Ch. 1957).
49. See generally Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir.
1984); Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1983); Brandon v. Chefetz, 121
Misc.2d 54, 467 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Zimmerman v. Bell, 585 F.
Supp. 512 (D. Md. 1984).
50. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)) (1968).
51. H.R. REP. No. 91-1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 reprinted in 1970 CONG. &
AD. NEws 5052.
52. Id. §5.
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on eight occasions, 53 while private individuals have brought actions
under section 14(e) over 300 times.5 ' Therefore, although the Act does
not expressly grant an individual shareholder the power to use section
14(e), the courts have continued to imply a cause of action for the individual shareholder under section 14(e).
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act requires the plaintiff to prove
that the target company made a misleading statement or omission of a
material fact or an intent to defraud third party investors in relation to
tender offers.5 5 Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that he subsequently relied on the misrepresentations and suffered damage.5 6 Therefore, a shareholder who is seeking damages for a golden parachute may
either base his Williams Act claim on negligence or fraud.
Courts have struggled with the definition of a misstatement or
omission of a material fact under the Williams Act in relation to a
tender offer. Some courts have held that shareholders must prove only
negligence 58 and other courts require the more stringent test of showing
a reckless failure by directors of a corporation to make reasonable facts
available to shareholders that shareholders could have discovered with
reasonable effort.5 9 This distinction may become important when examining the disclosure requirements for golden parachutes and their im-

53. Note, Securities Law: Implied Causes of Action Under Section 14(E) of The
Williams Act, 66 MINN. L. REv. 865, 870 n.23 (1982).
54. Id. at 870 n.23.
55. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (n)(e)) (1968). § 78 (n)(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition
to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Id.
56. See Chris Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 373 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 283 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981).
57. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (n)(e)) (1968).
58. See SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1268 (D.D.C. 1978).
59. Chris Craft , 480 F.2d at 363.
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pact on the shareholder. A shareholder may be able to discover the
existence of golden parachutes with reasonable effort but the question
becomes should he have to make such an effort.
The Securities and Exchange Commission is attempting to restrict
the use of golden parachutes through specific disclosure provisions. Revised Item 402(e)60 , an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1933, requires a separate disclosure for compensation paid to an executive triggered by a change in control."1 However, there are many
loopholes in this provision that may permit an omission of a material
fact that would be misleading under the Williams Act. For example,
the new disclosure provision requires individual disclosure of golden
parachutes only for the top five employees of a corporation, and group
disclosure for all executive officers.6 2 However, United Technologies
Corporation has golden parachutes for 64 of its employees, Kimberly
Clark Corporation protects 80 executives, and Beneficial Corporation
maintains golden parachutes for a staggering 250 executives. 3 These
numbers of covered employees appear way beyond the disclosure requirements. Therefore, the amount of a golden parachute compensation
disclosed to a shareholder may be, in reality, a mere fraction of the
total price a corporation may be required to pay to its executives upon
the triggering event. This omission may be sufficient to constitute a
violation of the Williams Act.
Furthermore, although disclosure is required for a change in control agreement, there are many definitions of what constitutes a change
of control. 64 Although acquisition of fifty-one percent of the shares of a
corporation is a standard definition, working control in many cases may
be obtained with less than a majority of shares. 65 Therefore, according
to the provisions of a particular golden parachute agreement even a
twenty percent investment block or smaller percentage of shares could
trigger the payoff.6" Mohasco Corporation and Olin Corporation are

60. See Final SEC Rules On Disclosure of Executive Compensation, 15 SEc.
& L. REP. (BNA) at 1852 (Sept. 30, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Final SEC
Rules].
REG.

61.
62.
63.

64.

Id.

Id. at 1854.
See Morrison, supra note 7, at 86.
See Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM L. REV. 1212, 1213-16

(1958).

65. Id. at 1213.
66. See generally Meyer, Lawyer's Lament, Arbitrager'sDelight,

FORBES, May

24, 1982, at 31.
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examples of two companies in which a twenty percent change of ownership will trigger their respective golden parachutes.6 7 Since the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 402(e) doesn't specifically define
what constitutes a change in control, the shareholder is basically unaware under what circumstances the parachute may be paid. Although a
specific change in control section was proposed, it has not been
adopted."8 The Commission felt that these disclosed matters were encompassed in other sections. Therefore, disclosure of golden parachutes
can remain relatively hidden behind a myriad of ambiguous terms.6,
The golden parachute becomes lost among other types of bonuses when
there is no specific change in control section. A company's failure to
disclose its change in control terms that trigger its golden parachutes
could further be a misleading omission under the Williams Act.
The major problem, however, with a shareholder pursuing a remedy for golden parachutes is that courts have held that the Williams
Act is not applicable to mere breach of fiduciary duty.70 A shareholder
seeking to hold corporate officers liable for a negligent omission of a
material fact in relation to disclosure of a golden parachute may, in
reality, be alleging merely a breach of fiduciary duty. The rationale for
imposing this restriction on the Williams Act is that state law governs
fiduciary duty of corporations and to impose a federal standard of fiduciary duty would constitute an overlap of state and federal law.71 As
previously noted, however, a shareholder will most likely not be able to
proceed with a lawsuit under state law because of the standing problem. Since there is no viable state remedy for a shareholder attacking a
golden parachute after a takeover has occurred, a Williams Act claim
under federal law used would not be usurping a state's power to govern
fiduciary duty claims.
A potential problem in using the Williams Act is that courts have

67.
68.

See Morrison, supra note 7, at 87.
See Final SEC Rules, supra note 60, at 1856.

69.

However, at least one court has held that merely disclosing the formula for

calculating a golden parachute is inadequate because it did not stress the importance of
this compensation. See Negligence Standard,Not Scienter, Test of Proxy Disclosure's
Adequacy, 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1740 (Sept. 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited
as Negligence Standard].
70. See Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Berman v. Gerber
Products, 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
71. Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 621, 649 (1983).
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72
ruled that section 14(e) is not applicable to some defensive tactics
because they are not sufficiently manipulative or deceptive to fall
within 14(e). 73 To maintain an action under section 14(e) of the Williams Act it would appear that a stronger claim than breach of fiduciary duty is needed. Not only would a shareholder have to show a material omission that is misleading, but most likely would have to show
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts in connection with the
tender offer. But there are some golden parachutes created in anticipation of a takeover that may be fraudulent and manipulative.
A target company does not have to disclose its merger talks with a
bidder. 74 A shareholder need only be informed once there is an agreement on price and structure.7 5 It is possible that target management
could create a golden parachute during these talks since golden
parachutes require no shareholder ratification, 76 and the Securities and
Exchange Commission does not require a corporation to disclose
whether this plan was ratified by the shareholders. 77 Arguably then, a
corporation may create golden parachutes to forestall the takeover bid
or to pay themselves a bonus when the takeover becomes apparent. Although the motive may be self-interest, the result is a reduction in a
shareholder's price per share due to the inclusion of the golden
parachutes. 78 In this respect, certain golden parachutes can be viewed
as a manipulative device which involves conduct that artifically affects
market activity so as to mislead investors.7 9 Market activity mustobe
artificially affected to the extent that the activity is disguised or deliberately concealed from investors.8 0 Therefore, the computations of
golden parachutes in the offering price to a shareholder during a tender
offer period may be disguised activity because their bargaining effect

72. Altman, 431 F. Supp. at 314. Berman, 454 F. Supp. at 1318.
73. See Mobil v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
74. Greenfield v. Heublin, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3rd Cir. 1984).
75.

Id.

76. Ratification shifts the burden to the shareholder to prove unfairness of the
plan and the business judgment rule then applies. Without ratification, where directors
are fixing their own compensation, the burden is on the directors to show good faith
and fairness. See Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1979).
77. "Ratification disclosure is not material since investors are mainly concerned
with the terms of the plan and not its likelihood of shareholder approval." See Negligence Standard, supra note 69, at 1742.

78. Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1982, at 6, col. 6.
79. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
80. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374.
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might have depressed the value of a shareholder's stock.
Furthermore, even if there has been full disclosure to shareholders
of golden parachutes, section 14(e) can still apply, if the effect of the
disclosure gives the shareholders "no real alternative than to accept the
offer.""' This could occur when a corporation has large blocks of institutional investors who are traditionally pro management and ultimately
control the outcome of a tender offer at the expense of minority shareholders. 2 In essence, the minority shareholder is forced into a position
of tendering his shares to the acquiring corporation. In this regard, during a tender offer period, golden parachutes can become fraudulent,
manipulative devices and a shareholder may be able to maintain a
cause of action under the Williams Act. However, the problems with
categorizing golden parachutes as a fiduciary matter coupled with the
traditional view of the Williams Act as used to control rigged sales,
wash sales, or other extremely manipulative activities,83 may make this
federal claim more difficult.
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Advisory Committee
on Tender Offers is attempting to control the use of golden parachutes
during tender offer periods through specific proposals. The Advisory
Committee has expressed concern about a board of directors' adoption
of golden parachutes after a tender offer period has begun. As a result
of this concern, the Committee has proposed a provision which would
prohibit a corporation from adopting change in control contracts during
a tender offer period.84 Furthermore, the Committee recommends that
at each annual meeting shareholders should be requested to vote on an
advisory basis as to whether the corporation should continue to use
golden parachutes. 85 By restricting the use of golden parachutes during
a tender offer period and making the shareholder more aware of their
existence, a board of directors may become more reluctant in creating
them initially. The Advisory Committee's proposals may be the best
solution to the problem of golden parachutes and would reduce the
need for after the fact litigation.

81. Id. at 377.
82. Note, supra note 1, at 356.
83. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
84. SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers Special Report,
REP. (CCH) No. 1028 at 40 (Recommendation 38) (July 15, 1983).
85. Id. at 39.
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Attacking Golden Parachutes from the Back Door: The
1984 Tax Reform Act

Although the Securities and Exchange Commission may be tightening its control of golden parachutes, the Internal Revenue Service
has taken an active step in restricting their use as well. The 1984 Tax
Reform Act has established that "no deduction is allowed for payments
to key officers under golden parachute contracts which exceed reasonable compensation and such excess payments are subject to a twenty
percent excise tax". 86 Prior to this Act, corporations were allowed a
deduction for all expenses that were ordinary and necessary to carry on
business. s7 Inclusive in these expenses were reasonable allowances for
salaries or other compensations."8 Since golden parachutes had not
been adjudged to be unreasonable, 89 the cost to the corporation of paying these change in control bonuses were deducted as an expense.9"
The reason Congress has enacted this golden parachute provision
is two-fold. First, the Senate Finance Committee believed that golden
parachutes served no benefit to the corporation but merely permitted
an "entrenched management team to stay in control." 91 Second, the
Committee believed that golden parachutes may provide corporate
funds to subsidize officers or other highly compensated executives when
these individuals leave the corporation. 92 The Committee was "unwilling to let the tax law be used in such a manner that would encourage
this subsidy." 93 Therefore, it was deemed necessary to impose a penalty
when a corporation granted a golden parachute to a key executive.
Under the 1984 Tax Reform Act, no deduction is allowed for any
94
compensation arrangement which is an "excess parachute payment".
An "excess parachute payment" is one that is three times greater than
an individual's base amount, which basically entails his average gross
86. I.R.C., §§ 280(G), 4999 (1984), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, §46, 98 STAT. 585 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform Act of
1984].
87. Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH Special)
No. 16 at 195 (April 5, 1984).
88. Id. at 195.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
90. See Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The RIA Complete Analysis of the 1984 Tax Reform Act, Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d § 254 (1984).
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income over the past five years."' For example, if an individual's base
amount is $100,000, a single payment totalling $400,000 is an "excess
parachute payment" because it exceeds $300,000 (three times the base
amount of $100,000). 96 Under the Act, the $300,000 is nondeductible
($400,000 minus base amount of $100,000), not just the $100,000 that
is in excess of what the Committee believes is reasonable compensation. 97 Also, the recipient of this golden parachute will have to pay
$60,000 in excise taxes ($300,000 x 20%) in addition to regular income
taxes. 98 However, a corporation will be able to reduce the amount of
the "excess parachute payment" if it can show by clear and convincing
evidence that the excess portion is reasonable compensation for services
actually rendered. 99 Furthermore, although there is a standard formula
for calculating excess parachute payments, any contract which the Securities and Exchange Commission classifies as violative of Federal Securities Laws or Regulations will be subject to the no deduction penalty
of the Act.100
The 1984 Tax Reform Act imposes a heavy tax penalty on a corporation granting golden parachutes. It is difficult to comprehend why
Congress has granted this right to the IRS to restrict golden
parachutes in the form of a tax penalty. A corporation is taxed for the
privilege of doing business as a corporation - a privilege created by
the government.10 ' Therefore, the government is justified in- receiving
income in order to distribute the cost of government fairly, and to promote economic growth, stability and efficiency which are the basic
goals of the tax system.' 02 However, the projected revenue that the IRS
will receive from golden parachutes is less than five million dollars. 103
This pales in comparison to the 31.3 billion dollars corporations paid in
95. Id. The actual formula is:
the aggregate present value of all such contingent compensation payments
that equal or exceeds three times the base amount. The base amount is the
average annualized compensation includable in a disqualified individual's
gross income in the five-taxable-year period preceding the taxable year in
which the change of ownership or control of the corporation occurs.
Id., § 280 (G)(b)(d).

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 97.
99. Id. at 99.
100. Id. at 97.
101.

J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 129 (1983).

102.
103.

Id. at 5.
Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, supra note 87, at 196.
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taxes in 1982.104 Furthermore, the underlying reason behind the golden
parachute provision in the 1984 Act is a general distain of corporations
using golden parachutes as a defensive tactic to remain in control. 10 5
Arguably, the IRS should not be regulating a corporation's management decisions by imposing a tax penalty. However, it appears that
Congress is unwilling to rule that golden parachutes are illegal and is
unwilling to grant enforcement rights to the Securities and Exchange
Commission which seems to be the proper agency to regulate golden
parachutes.
It is still too early to determine whether the 1984 Tax Reform Act
will cause a great reduction in the use of golden parachutes by corporations. In the opinion of one treasurer of a major corporation'0 6 listed on
the American Stock Exchange, golden parachutes will continue to be
used despite the tax law. 107 This treasurer believes that golden
parachutes are still very viable because "as with any tax law there are
loopholes". 10 8 A corporation could avoid the harsh effects of the tax by
"basically increasing an executive's base amount thereby allowing a
parachute payment to come within the three times limitation". 10 9 Alternatively, he felt that a corporation that is a frequent target may
increase an employee's pension plan which is compensation that does
not fall within an individual's base amount. 110 Therefore, it appears
that just as corporations have managed to side step disclosure provisions regarding golden parachutes, they will also discover alternative
methods to escape the 1984 Tax Act.

V.

Conclusion

Golden parachutes are created in many forms and encompass varying amounts. Some may be reasonably within a corporation's frame-

104. PECHMAN, supra note 97, at 144.
105. Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, supra note 87. However, it is possible
that this could make golden parachutes a stronger defensive weapon since an acquiring
corporation would have to compute twice the amount of the golden parachute since it is
not deductible as an expense.
106. This corporation is a public corporation on the American Stock Exchange
and a potential target for a takeover.
107. Telephone interview with the treasurer of a corporation listed on the American Stock Exchange (Feb. 1, 1985).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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work. However, golden parachutes that are created in relation to tender
offers require close scrutiny. An executive who has a golden parachute
is likely to have a conflict of interest which may ultimately lead to a
breach of fiduciary duty or even fraud. However, an effective remedy is
presently unavailable to the shareholder either at the state or federal
level. The 1984 Tax Reform Act may have created a deterrence that
the shareholder has been unable to accomplish. Yet the fact remains
that the golden parachute is still a legal corporate creation whose ultimate victim is the shareholder.
Lynn A. Epstein
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